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AGREEMENTS AM1ONG COMPETITORS:
Incidental and Reasonable Restraints of Trade
By G. E. HALE*
B Y the terms of the Sherman Act' every contract in restraint of
trade is unlawful; But long ago the gloss softened the text and
a vague "rule of reason" supplanted the strict letter of the statute.2
In some fields the contours of that rule have been staked with fair
*A.B. Yale 1935; LL.B. Harvard 1938; J.S.D. University of Chicago
1940; -member of the Illinois bar and of the bar of the Supreme Court of the
United States.
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1. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1946). 1 Marketing Laws
Survey, State Antitrust Laws (U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1940), Col-
lection and Survey of State Antitrust Laws, 32 Col. L. Rev. 347 (1932).
2. See Standard Oil Company v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 66
(1911). In Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 238
(1918) Mr. justice Brandeis declared. " . the legality of an agreement
or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test, as whether it re-
strains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of
trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true
test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the
court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which
the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The
history of the restraint, the evil believed to e.ist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant
facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objection-
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precision .3 As to most subjects, however, there are little more
than rudimentary guideposts. 4 This paper attempts to delineate
a principal type of contract which may restrain trade: the agreement
among competitors. 5
Certain types of competitors' agreements have been studied
carefully by courts and observers. There has been much discussion,
for instance, of the extent to which competitors may go in gath-
ering and disseminating statistics of prices, production, inven-
tories and the like.6 But many other arrangements among comn-
peting enterprisers have passed almost without critical notice.
Perhaps lawyers have generally assumed that such activities were
lawful. In any event, the overlooked topics have often been re-
garded as "reasonable" or "incidental" restraints of trade. While
passing mention will be made of the chief types of contracts which
have commanded extensive attention in the past, the focus of this
paper is upon those forms of agreement which may qualify for the
category of reasonable restraints. In so surveying the whole field
of competitors' agreements no attempt can be made to discuss any
one topic exhaustively. The aim is rather to find general considera-
tions bearing upon the proper relationship of competing enter-
prises in a free economy.
FORMS OF AGREEMENT
Trade association activities furnish the largest number of
examples of agreements among competitors. Perhaps few associa-
tion actions are governed by formal contracts among members. In
anti-trust law, however, a mere course of conduct suffices to switch
on the Sherman Act's searching light.7
Surveys have shown trade associations8 to be engaged in a
able regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences."
3. Although it is difficult or impossible to reconcile the decisions,
critical comment upon the monopoly aspects of mergers and consolidations
has been illuminating. Handler, A Study of the Construction and Enforce-
ment of the Federal Antitrust Laws 46 ff. (TNEC Monograph 38, 1941).
4. See notes 53, 54 infra.
5. Merger and consolidation of competing business units and agree-
ments in furtherance thereof are not discussed. On that subject consult
Handler, Industrial Mergers autd the Antitrust Laws, 32 Col. L. Rev. 179
(1932) ; United States v. Columbia Steel Corporation, 334 U. S. 495 (1948).
6. See note 141 infra.
7. See American Tobacco Company v. United States, 328 U. S. 781,
809 ff. (1946). In Department of Commerce, Trade Association Activities 48
(1927) it is said: "The very fact of the existence of a trade association indi-
cates the existence of an agreement ....
8. Distinguish chambers of commerce, which are predominantly
composed of non-competitors. Oliphant, Trade Associations and the Low. 26
Col. L. Rev. 381 (1926). Judkins, Trade and Professional Associations
of the United States, Dept. of Commerce, Industrial Series No. 3, 1 ff. (1942).
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wide variety of activities. Possibly most persistent is convention
holding, to "discuss problems before the industry." They also
issue publications, establish business "standards," furnish statisti-
cal services, attempt to influence legislation, combat "unfair" com-
petition, secure publicity for their industries, "educate" the pub-
lic, keep an eye on-labor relations, perform technical research, and
do a number of other things presently to be set forth.10
Loose associations of competitors are no novelty of this age
but the modem trade group dates from Mr. Eddy's day. In 1912
he brought out his book, The New Competition," the thesis of
which was that competition (regarded as the survival of the fittest)
was no longer ethically acceptable and should be replaced by "co-
operation." 2 He urged the formation of industry-wide organiza-
tions to promote "fair" competition.13 About the same time "codes
of ethics" became popular and many associations promulgated
such documents.' 4 Both World War I and World War II stimulated
trade association activity because the federal government was
forced to rely upon industry groups for information and guidance
in controlling the domestic economy.15 After the first war, too,
there arose a movement for the elimination of "waste" in industry
in which trade associations played an important role.20 Finally,
9. E.g. National Association of Credit Jewelers. Chicago Journal of
Commerce, July 29, 1948, p. 1, col. 6.
10. Judkins, Trade Associations in the United States 12 ff. (1933).
11. For a brief history of trade associations consult Judkins, supra
note 8, at 2 ff.
12. Eddy, The New Competition 14 (1912).
13. Id. at 56. Mr. Eddy's program involved the enforcement of honest
weights and measures, elevation of standards of sanitation, insistence upon
a single price to all customers, frank statements concerning the condition of
sales (full disclosure of quality of goods?), a prohibition upon sales below
cost and insistence upon truth in advertising.
14. Lee, Business Ethics 176 ff. (1926). The "truth in advertising"
movement was closely allied to the codes of ethics. Gott, Development of
Trade Associations 8 (1937). Some of the codes contained doubtful provi-
sions (prohibitions upon submission of supplementary bids; agreements not
to accept "returns". of merchandise). National Industrial Conference Board
(hereinafter NICB), Trade Associations, Their Economic Significance and
Legal Status 199 ff. (1925).
15. Foth, Trade Associations, Their Services to Industry 21 ff. (1930);
Watson, Trade Association Participation in the War, 24 Proc. Am. Trade
Ass'n Exs. 56, 58 (1943) (many trade association executives obtained offi-
cial positions in government agencies); Coonley, Address, 23 Proc. Am.
Trade Ass'n Exs. 2, 7 (1943). In Great Britain trade associations assumed,
during the -ar, the function of allocating scarce materials. Mitchell, Or-
ganization. of Industry: British and American Trade Groups Compared,
Dun's Rev. 15, 16 (June 1946).
16. Secretary of Commerce- Hoover was perhaps the leader of the
"movement"
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the N.R.A. experiment was a powerful factor in fostering coopera-
tion among competitors. 7
Apart from organized exchanges, baseball is the industry which
has carried agreements farthest. After the "Black Sox" scandal of
1919 the proprietors of professional baseball teams laced them-
selves into a tight net of restraint. A "commissioner" exercises
almost dictatorial powers over the trade and many of the agree-
ments among the proprietors go beyond anything formally attempt-
ed in other fields."' It should be observed, however, that the com-
petition of baseball is not what it seems: from a commercial point
of view, the teams do not compete to win games but are joint
producers of an amusement spectacle.
A second and more formalized type of agreement among com-
petitors is the Trade Practice Conference Rule. Often initiated by
17. Anderson, What Does Industry Expect from Its Trade Organiza-
tion?, 17 Proc. Am. Trade Ass'n Exs. 50, 51 (1936) : "It was part of the
theory of the N.R.A. that, so far as possible, the trade associations should
set up and administer the machinery for regulating their industries within
the requirements of the Act." Indeed, section 3(a) of the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act itself, 48 Stat. 198 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 703 (1946)
provided: "Upon the application ...by one or more trade or industrial
associations or groups, the President may approve a code or codes of fair
competition for the trade or industry... ." See Whitney, Trade Associations
and Industrial Control 32 ff. (1934); Holbrook, Price Reporting as a
Trade Association Activity, 35 Col. L. Rev. 1053, 1061 (1935) (N.R.A.
used as cloak for establishment of price filing schemes, fixing future prices).
Even prior to the advent of the present Labor regime, trade associa-
tions in Britain had assumed a far more positive role than in the United
States: ". . . only by concerted action of an industry as a whole has it
seemed possible to remove the obstacles that have been thwarting per-
manent recovery. The mounting inferiority of British producers has forced
them to present a united front against the pressure of foreign competition
there has emerged a profound modification in the traditional British
system of free competition, a development in which the association has
played a leading role ...there are about 50 price-fixing associations in
the iron and steel industry alone. Since 1931 the coal industry has been
thoroughly regimented under regional boards, which rigidly control prices
and output. In textiles most of the specialized sections ...have long been
subject to the control of strong associations. . . " Lucas, Restrictive Activi-
ties of the British Trade Association, 13 Hary. Bus. Rev. 453 ff. (1935).
18. Baseball's basic codes are published annually in the Blue Book
issued by the Heilbroner Baseball Bureau. They are Major League Agree-
ment (National League of Professional Baseball Clubs and American League
of Professional Baseball Clubs) Heilbroner 501 (1948); Major League
Rules, id. at 507; Major-Minor League Agreement (two major leagues and
National Association of Professional Baseball Players), id. at 601; Major-
Minor League Rules, id. at 607. Without discussion of their antitrust aspects,
the agreements vesting vast discretionary power in the commissioner were
sustained in Milwaukee Association v. Landis 49 F. 2d 298 (N.D. Ill. 1931).
Additional authorities are cited at notes 59, 60, infra. For a description of a
trade association enjoying statutory powers, consult Grant, The National
Association of Securities Dealers: Its Origin and Operation, 1942 Wis. L.
Rev. 597.
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trade associations,' 9 the rules have long been sponsored by the
Federal Trade Commission.2" In theory, at least, the conferences
are attended only by representatives of a given industry, who
formulate a code of fair competition for their trade. The Commis-
sion then publishes such rules as it approves.2 As published the
rules fall under two headings, Group I and Group II, the difference
between the two being that-the Commission is not ready to declare
a rule falling under the second category a statement of the law
as it stands.
22
Since no provision was made therefor in the Federal Trade
Commission Act, publication of the Rules has always constituted
a "nonlegal, nonstatutory procedure."2 3 Thus the Rules are but
"advisory interpretations" of action which the Commission may
take under its express powers.24 And although the Commission
itself is charged with the enforcement of a portion of the anti-
trust laws, its approval of the industry-made agreements affords
no immunity from litigation.
2 5
19. Federal Trade Commission, Annual Report 99 (1936).
20. Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission 78 ff. (1925) ; Gaskill,
The Regulation of Competition 106 ff. (1936) ; Miller, Unfair Competition
267 ff. (1941).
21. Descriptions of the procedure may be found in Lyon et aL., Gov-
ernment & Economic Life 288 (1939) ; Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., Federal
Trade Commission, Sen. Doc. No. 186, part 6, 76th Cong. 3d sess. 32 (1940) ;
TNEC, Trade Association Survey 119 ff. (monograph No. 18). Certainly
formulation of the rules involves enough industry participation to apply the
antitrust laws. Cf. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U. S. 208, 226
(1939) (mere response to invitation by concert of action suffices to prove
agreement).
22. Group 1 rules are "considered to be unfair methods of competition,
unfair or deceptive acts ... prohibited under laws administered by the...
Commission... and appropriate proceedings will be taken by the Commis-
sion to prevent the use of such unlawful practices. . . ." Compliance with
Group 2 rules, however, is merely ".. . considered to be conducive to sound
business methods and is to be encouraged and promoted individually or
through voluntary cooperation exercised in accordance with existing law.
Nonobservance of such rules does not, per se, constitute violation of law.
Where, however, the practice of not complying with any such Group 2 rules
is followed in such a mnner as to result in unfair methods of competition
contrary to law, corrective proceedings may be instituted by the Commis-
sion as in the case of Group 1 rules.' Federal Trade Commission, op. cit.
supra note 19, at 113. Query whether the foregoing statement is either
correct in fact or sound in policy.
23. Gaskill, op. cit. supra note 20, at 108. According to the Commis-
sion, ". . . this work is performed under authority of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, and other laws administered by the Commission, whereby
the Commission is empowered and directed to prevent the use in commerce
of unfair methods of competition and other illegal practices." Federal Trade
Commission, op. cit. supra note 19, at 7. Note the vague reference to the
Act (38 Stat. 717, [1914], 15 U.S.C. § 41 [1946]) and "other laws."
24. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., op. cit. supra note 21, at 31.
25. Mere approval of an agreement by an executive officer of the
government does not, of course, furnish antitrust immunity. See United
19491
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RELATIONS WITH SUPPLIERS
Competitors frequently act in concert to affect their relations
with common suppliers of raw materials or services. Many trade
associations, for instance, provide their members with detailed
data concerning railway tariffs, classifications, rules and em-
bargoes.26 Such activities lead naturally to a consideration of the
level of railway rates. Thus trade associations may bring pressure
to bear in order to secure more favorable transportation condi-
tions.
2
7
In similar fashion information about insurance is disseminated
from trade association offices, 28 perhaps coupled with an attempt
to increase the insurance coverage of members of the industry."
Again, such activities lead to pressure upon insurance prices and
dissatisfied industries have even operated insurance companies of
their own.30
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Corp., 310 U. S. 150, 225 ff. (1940). In Para-
mount Corp. v. United States, 282 U. S. 30 (1930) one of the Rules was
apparently held to constitute a violation of Section I of the Sherman Act(see summary of argument at 32) ; T. P. C. Motion-Picture Industry, rule
1, CCH Trade Reg. Serv. ff 2541 (1928); Note, Does the Sherman Act
Prohibit the Adoption of Standard Contracts and Arbitration Agreements
by Trade Con!erencesf, 40 Yale L. J. 640, 642 (1931). But cf. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U. S. 407 (1942) (statement
of intention as to exercise of licensing power in future enjoinable).
Perhaps as a result of the Paramount case, supra, or in the belief that
the then existing Trade Practice Conference Rules were sheltering price
fixing schemes, the Commission revised all its published codes in 1930-31.
See Burns, The Decline of Competition 70 (1936) ; Gaskill, op. cit. sup'ra
note 20, at 120 ff. It has been said that the conferences, "under the unremitting
pressure of trade associations," developed into a "device for controlling prices
through definitions of 'unfair' and 'discriminatory' price policies." Watkins,
Trade Associations, 14 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 670, 675 (1934). See also Kittelle
& Mostow, A Review of the Trade Practice Conferences of the Federal
Trade Commission, 8 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 427, 436 ff. (1940).
26. NICB, op. cit. supra note 14, at 259 ff. Nearly a third of the
associations responding to a questionnaire were active in this field and some
of them gave "service for loss and damage claims" or audited transportation
bills. Gott, Association Activities 12 (1938) ; May, The Trade Association
and Its Place in the Business Fabric, 2 Harv. Bus. Rev. 84, 90 (1923).
27. Jones, Trade Association Activities and the Law 169 ff. (1922);
1 N. A. M. A. Cooperator No. 1, 3 (1947). "The FEI has a Traffic Com-
mittee composed of representatives of various branches of the industry which
meets monthly to consider transportation problems affecting the industry.
The minimum weights, classification ratings, etc., applying to farm equip-
ment didn't just happen. They were obtained and retained only by diligent
effort of the Institute ... ." Farm Equipment Institute, A Good Investment-
Membership in Your Trade Association 3 (1947).
28. Naylor, Trade Associations: Their Organization and Management
151 ff. (1921).
29. Gott, op. cit. supra note 26, at 7; Kline, Insurance Activities of
Trade Associations, 24 J. Am. Ins. 23 (1947).
30. NICB, op. cit. supra note 14, at 12, 249 ff.; Gott, op. cit. supra
note 26, at 7 (one-tenth of associations investigated arranging for or sup-
plying insurance protection to members) ; Kline, supra note 29, at 25
(group rates obtained by associations cut costs).
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Perhaps raw materials generally less frequently command the
attention of competitors as a group. But some trade associations
gather information concerning the availability of supplies 1 and
others have gone so far as to set up central buying agencies.32
Pooled purchasing could, of course, amount to monopsony33 and
it is well established that the anti-trust laws are applicable to buying
as well as selling.3 4 There remains, however, the question of
whether the combination is unreasonable.
It is interesting to note that combined activities of competitors
in relation to their suppliers have focused upon railroad and in-
surance companies. Both railroading and insuring are fixed-price
businesses. Rates are set either by agreement of the sellers or by
public authority."' There is, therefore, at least a degree of monopoly
upon the selling side. Thus it is not surprising that no case has
been found in which collective bargaining by the buyers has been
condemned or challenged.38
31. Naylor, op. cit. stpra note 28, at 98. This author (at 114) urges
the -standardization of raw materials by trade associations because it enables
members to compare prices in buying.
32. Id. at 169; Gott, op. cit. supra note 26, at 3. Cooperative shipping
(pooled cars, etc.) is another activity. Id. at 8.
33. Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect Competition 215 (1933).
34. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781 (1946);
Paramount Pictures v. United Motion Picture Owners, 93 F. 2d 714 (3rd
Cir. 1937); United States v. Whiting, 212 Fed. 466 (D. Mass. 1914) ; see
United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U. S. 173. 181 (1944) semble;
Montrose Lumber Co. v. United States, 124 F. 2d 573, 577 (10th Cir. 1941) ;
Hood Rubber Co. v. United States Rubber Co., 229 Fed. 583, 587 ff. (D.
Mass. 1916). But cf. Arnold v. Burgess, 241 App. Div. 364, 272 N. Y.
Supp. 534 (1934) (defendant association adopted rule requiring members
to do own estimating on construction of iron work, thus injuring business of
plaintiff engineer who formerly enjoyed their patronage; recovery denied).
35. See German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 416 ff.
(1914) ; see also allegations in United States v. Association of American
Railroads, 4 F. R. D. 510, 515 ff. (1945) ; Patterson, The Insurance Com-
missioner in the United States, c. III D (1927) ; 3B Sharfman, The Interstate
Commerce Commission, c. 14 (1936); Dickinson, Railroad Rates and the
Antitrtst Laws, 12 I. C. C. Practitioner 936 (1945). Cf. § 13 of the Inter-
state Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 383 (1887), 49 U. S. C. § 13 (1) (1946).
36. In United States v. National. Peanut Cleaners' Association (E.D.
Va. No. 109, 15 June 1925) section 4 (5) of the decree permitted the trade
association to "handle the insurance of its members, including fire, industrial,
indemnity or group insurance." See Jones, op. cit. stpra note -7, at 3-9
(famous Hoover-Daugherty correspondence), NICB, op. cit. supra note 14,
at 246. Urging all industry members to carry full insurance may raise the
costs of marginal firms. Thus it may influence price competition. Query
whether that influence is not salutary. And some activities have been
directed at discrimination in rates against individual industry members.
Id. at 257. It is also possible, of course, that certain groups of competitors
have used their influence upon rate structures in an attempt to cripple mar-
ginal firms. Jones, mipra note 27, at 178.
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RELATIONS WITH EMPLOYEES
Labor problems are increasingly important in trade association
work.3 7 Associations collect and disseminate data concerning hours,
wages, working conditions, vacations, hiring and firing techniques,
promotion policies and the like. 8 Some associations prepare stan-
dard job descriptions and supply advice on negotiations with labor
unions.8 9
Slightly more positive is the role of the trade association in
employee "welfare" activities. In the vagueness of that term are
embraced such matters as collecting and disseminating information
regarding health programs, group insurance, employees' thrift
schemes and the like.40 Industry-wide safety campaigns have often
been conducted 41 in order to protect employees and reduce insur-
ance rates.42 Training in safety leads to instruction in other sub-
jects and there are numerous instances in which employers have
combined to bring vocational education to their employees or
apprentices.43
37. Gott, op. cit. supra note 26, at 2.
38. NICB, op. cit. supra note 14, at 272; Gott, op. cit. supra note 26,
at 1, 4. The United States Red Cedar Shingle Industry Inc. compiles statis-
tics respecting hours, wages and related matters. United States Tariff
Commission, Report on Red-Cedar Shingles 18 (Rep. No. 149, 1942).
39. Smith, They Pay Off In Better Bargaining, 36 Nation's Business
35 ff., 56 (1948) (trade associations collect provisions commonly inserted in
collective bargaining contracts, etc.); Straus, Management's Union, The
Trade Association, 164 Commercial & Financial Chronicle 3346, 3363 (1946).
Straus (at 3362) claims that such activities do not inevitably lead to industry-
wide collective bargaining.
40. Gott, op. cit. .rupra note 26, at 5. (About 10% of associations reply-
ing to query engaged in this field; same number "formulating and promoting
industry policies" on this topic.) Section 1 of the rules of the International
Association of Garment Workers provided that the employers should pro-
mote the welfare of their employees through group insurance, better
machinery, promotion by merit, safety campaigns and the like. Lee, op. cit.
supra note 14, at 289. Hoover's letter to Daugherty raised a question as to
the propriety of such activities. Apparently the Attorney General had no
objection thereto. Jones, supra note 27, at 330.
41. Department of Commerce, op. cit. supra note 7, at 123; NICB, op.
cit. stupra note 14, at 271 ff.; Jones, supra note 27, at 134; Rowden, En-
lightened Self-Interest: A Study of Educational Programs of Trade Associa-
tions 36 (1937).
42. Kline, supra note 29, at 24.
43. Department of Commerce, op. cit. supra note 7, at 130 ff.; Naylor,
op. cit. supra note 28, at 142 ff.; Gott, op. cit. supra note 26, at 4. Laundry-
owners' National Association conducts an extensive program, including
training films to teach routemen how not to annoy housewives, how to sell
more services, etc. Rowden, op. cit. supra note 41, at 12 ff. National Insti-
tute of Cleaning and Dyeing operates a vocational school, together with a
research laboratory, at which students are taught the operation of a dry
cleaning plant. Duncan, Trade Association Management 107 (1947). A
school for apprentices is conducted by the New York Employing Printers'
Association. Gutelius, Right-hand "Afet" to Printers: The Industry's Trade
Associations, 124 Am. Printer 37, 38 (1947). See also NICB, op. cit. supra
[Vol. 33:331
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In the foregoing fields concerted action by employers seems to
have raised little question of legality. But further steps are doubt-
ful. A number of trade associations serve as employment agencies
and offer placement services." No doubt such activities are useful
to employer and employee alike. They do, however, offer oppor-
tunities to deny workers a choice of jobs and to blacklist "undesir-
able" personnel.45 Temptations to fix a uniform scale of wages
must be difficult to resist. For such reasons the Supreme Court
held the employer operated "hiring hall" practice within the pro-
hibitions of the Sherman Act.46
The real problem, of course, is industry-wide bargaining. Long
ago groups of employers joined to bargain collectively with em-
ployees 47 and the practice is now fairly common. 48 No doubt
industry-wide bargaining is fostered by the operation of an em-
ployment service and by trade associations which formulate and
promote industry policies in regard to labor matters. 9 Certainly the
note 14, at 270 ff. Mrs. Rowden, whose work is the only comprehensive and
careful study of the subject found, asserted (at 62 ff.) that vocational pro-
grams sponsored by trade associations in the public schools were not achiev-
ing satisfactory results.
44. Naylor, op. cit. supra note 28, at 135 ff.; Gott, op. cit. supra note
26, at 5 (49 out of 330 associations so engaged). The Lake Carriers' Associa-
tion maintained hiring halls for seamen, Department of Commerce, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 131.
45. Thus the New York Employing Printers' Association engages in
the placement of "carefully investigated .. vorkers." Gutelius, supra note
43, at 39. Blacklisting of drunkards, professional malcontents, etc., might bejustified but who is to decide that a man falls into such a category?
46. Anderson v. Shipowners' Association, 272 U. S. 359 (1926) (see
opinion at 364: interference with commerce not incidental or indirect). A
fuller statement of facts is found in the report of an earlier stage of the
litigation, Street v. Shipowners' Association, 263 U. S. 334 (1923). Cf.
National Maritime Union of America, 78 N. L. R. B. No. 137 (1948) CCH
Lab. L. Rep. 8,047 (1948) (union operating hiring hall).
47. NICB, op. cit. vupra note 14, at 265 ff.
48. Id. at 266 ff.; TNEC, op. cit. supra note 21, at 326, 330 ff.; Gott,
op. cit. supra note 26, at 5 (38 out of 330 responding associations engaged
in collective bargaining) ; Duncan, op. cit. supra note 43, at 90 (1947 survey
showed 53.7%b of associations engaged in labor activities generally but only
8% [of that 53.7%] actually bargaining for members). In addition to the
well known cases of coal and railroading, the folloing examples of industry-
wide bargaining have come to light incidentally in this study: printing, fish-
packing, building management, stevedoring, lumbering, fur cutting and con-
tracting. Gutelius, supra note 43, at 38; Gottesman, Restraint of Trade-
Employees or Enterprisers?, 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 638, 656 (1948) ; Chicago
Real Estate Board, Agreement with Chicago Flat Janitors' Union, section
10, Chicago Real Estate Board Yearbook 366 ff. (1948); San Francisco
Stevedoring Company, 8 T. C. 222, 223 (1947); U. S. Tariff Commission,
op. cit. supra note 38, at 18: N. Y. Times, July 18, 1948, p. 44, col. 4;
Smith, supra note 39, at 57' (joint board to settle jurisdictional disputes).
49. Gott found 67 out of 330 responding associations to be engaged in
formulating labor policies, op. cit. supra note 26, at 4.
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Fair Labor Standards Act has encouraged the practice.- But the
real force behind industry-wide bargaining has been labor itself.
Unions, permitted 5 1-and perhaps encouraged-to do things for-
bidden others by the anti-trust laws, have often achieved industry-
wide status. When a union controls all the workers in an industry,
employers are strongly tempted to bargain with it as a group. 2
Whether industry-wide bargaining is lawful has not yet been
finally determined. Frequently the National Labor Relations Board
treats a group of employers as an appropriate bargaining unit."
And the Supreme Court has suggested its approval.5 4 Doubts
nevertheless remain.55
50. Section 5 of the F. L. S. A. of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29
U. S. C. § 205 (1946). Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., Administration of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Sen. Doc. No. 10, part 1, 77th Cong. 1st
sess. 12, 14, 26 (1941) (industry-wide committees of labor, employer and
"public" meet to fix minimum wages).
51. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 (1941) ; United States
v. International Hod Carriers, 37 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Ill. 1941), aff'd, 313
U. S. 539 (1941) ; United States v. American Federation of Musicians, 47
F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ill. 1942), af'd, 318 U. S. 741 (1943) ; United States
v. Bay Area Painters, 49 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal. 1943) (refusal to work
with labor-saving devices, etc.). See Berman, Labor and the Sherman Act
249 ff. (1930) ; consult Tunks, A New Federal Charter for Trade Unionism,
41 Col. L. Rev. 969 (1941).
52. "Only an association can deal with the many and complex questions
that arise regarding labor. It goes without saying that if employees are
organized employers must be . . ." Eddy, op. cit. supra note 12, at 151. See
Straus, supra note 39, at 3346, 3363. The dilemma created by labor's exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws is outlined in Gregory, Labor and the Law 242
(1946).
53. E.g., Alston Coal Co., 13 N. L. R. B. 683 (1939) ; Richard Young
Co., 64 N. L. R. B. 733 (1945); Waterfront Association, 71 N. L. R. B.
80 (1946) (see discussion at 109 ff.). See Gregory, op. cit. supra note 52,
at 245.
54. National Association of Window Manufacturers v. United States,
263 U. S. 403 (1923). In Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 503
ff. (1940) the court declared that successful union activity may influence
price competition, that to render a labor combination effective it must
eliminate competition from non-union made goods and that an elimination
of price competition based on differences in labor standards is the objective
of any national labor organization. But such an effect upon competition has
not been deemed the kind of curtailment of competition prohibited by the
Sherman Act. Thereupon, citing the Fair Labor Standards Act, etc., the
court continued (at 504, n. 24) : "Federal legislation aimed at protecting and
favoring labor organizations and eliminating the competition of employers
and employees based on labor conditions regarded as substandard, through
the establishment of industry-wide standards, both by collective bargaining
and by legislation setting up minimum wage and hour standards, supports
the conclusion that Congress does not regard the effects upon competition
from such combinations and standards as against public policy or condemed
by the Sherman Act." (Statement not necessary to decision.) Accord,
Androff v. Building Trade Employers' Union, 83 Ind. App. 294, 148 N. E.
203 (1925) (no statute cited); see Hunt v. Riverside Club, 140 Mich. 538,
547, 104 N. W. 40, 44 (1905); Cooke, Combinations, Monopolies & Labor
Unions § 126 (2d ed. 1909).
55. Anderson v. Shipowners' Association, 272 U. S. 359 (1926) semble.
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Adverse criticism of organized baseball has focused upon em-
ployee relations. Limitations upon the number of players," upon
their activities and provisions placing them in a rigid status" have
been attacked. Standardized contracts with perpetual renewal
options upon the part of the employers"8 are also sometimes found
objectionable. One court declared that the agreements made the
player a chattel, that they established a system of quasi-peonage
and that organized baseball constituted as. complete a monopoly
as could be devised. 9 Other judges, including one sitting in the
same court, ° have taken a more favorable view.
Perhaps the chief argument in favor of collective bargaining
upon the part of groups of employers is that it is necessary to meet
labor upon an equal footing. Herbert Hoover, as leader of the
movement for industrial cooperation, took that position." It must
That this case prohibited joint bargaining by employers is shown by the
fact that the lower court, on remand, found no evidence to support the
allegation thereof. Andersen v. Shipowners' Association, 31 F. 2d 539, 542
(9th Cir. 1929). Cf. Industrial Association v. United States, 268 U. S. 64
(1925) (employers attempted to enforce open shop by common agreement;
held, nwt within Sherman Act because activity purely local).
56. Major League rule 4 (a) : each team to consist of "not exceeding
forty (40) active and eligible players.....
57. Id., rule 18 (b) (participating in exhibition games); rule 20 (e)
(players not to own financial interest in any team) ; rule 2 (f) (players may
not count as coaches and vice versa); rule 3 (f) ("bonus" player, whose
salary over $6,000 per year subject to special rules of transfer, etc.).
58. Major League rule 3 (a). Restrictive as they may seem, there is,
no doubt, much to be said in favor of the rules.
59. American League Club v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 149 N. Y. Supp. 6,
12, 17, 19 (1914) : hill to enjoin baseball player from working for another
in violation of his contract with plaintiff. Held, relief denied because plaintiff
party to unlawful combination (agreement with other baseball teams). It is
interesting to note that the standardized contract appeared to be the focal
point of the court's attack.
60. American League Club v. Pasquel, 187 Misc. 230, 63 N. Y. S. 2d
537 (1946) (motion for preliminary injunction) ; 188 Misc. 102, 66 N. Y. S.
2d 743 (1946) (on demurrer). The Sherman Act was held not applicable to
organized baseball in 1922 because it was not "trade or commerce." Federal
Club v. National League, 259 U. S. 200 (1922). This decision is still fol-
lowed in the lower federal courts. Gardella v. Chandler, 79 F. Supp. 260
(S.D. N.Y. 1948), re'd C. A. 2d 9 Feb. 1949, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ff 62,
368. But its dependability as a precedent may well be doubted in the light of
subsequent Supreme Court decisions. Cf. American Medical Ass'n v. United
States, 317 U. S. 519 (1943); United States v. Southeastern Underwriters
Ass'n, 322 U. S. 533 (1944); see 33 Minn. L. Rev .. _.. (1949). See also
authorities cited notes 18, 119.
61. Hoover, Tenth Annual Report of the Secretary of Commerce 29 ff.
(1922). See also NICB, op. cit. .rpra note 14, at 268, 273 ff.; Alston Coal
Co., 13 N. L. R. B. 683, 689 (1939): "Bargaining and making contracts on
such a basis has helped to stabilize the coal mining industry and place the
mines on a fair competitive basis...." Jones, mtpra note 27, at 139 ff. (futile
to resist trend toward industry-wvide bargaining). But cf. Jewkes, Ordeal
by Planning 14 (1948) (attach upon "wave of the future" and "inevitability"
arguments for socialized economic planning). Organized labor generally
favors the practice. See, e.g., U. S. Dept. of Labor, Conferences on Industry-
Wide Collective Bargaining, 67 Lab. Rev. 40, 41 ff. (1948).
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be admitted, however, that the practice holds dangerous implica-
tions. It may lead to the listing of "legitimate" employers and the
boycotting (by labor) of those who cannot be "brought into line"
on matters of prices.6 2 It may eliminate natural advantages of
location enjoyed by some employers. 3 And when labor costs are
important in an industry, the temptation to fix prices along with
wages must be difficult to resist.8 4 Amid such hazards it is not
62. Straus, supra note 39, at 3363 (recalcitrant employers pushed into
line; to keep up prices?).
63. Cf. the arguments re the basing point practice. See note 94 inIra.
64. Although it may be true that all costs are essentially labor costs,
the proportion of gross receipts paid directly to employees varies markedly
from industry to industry. A recent compilation (1941-45) shows the follow-
ing figures for labor cost as a percentage of net sales:
Industry Labor Cost
tobacco ................................................................................................. 5.5%
petroleum and coal products ............................................................ 5.9
food products ....................................................................................... 7.4
beverages ............................................................................................ 7.5
chem icals ............................................................................................ 10.6
nonferrous m etals .............................................................................. 18.6
paper and products thereof ......................................................... 19.1
rubber products .................................................................................. 22.1
leather and products .......................................................................... 22.2
furniture and finished lumber ........................................................ 22.2
cotton textiles ...................................................................................... 22.2
other textile products ........................................................................ 22.5
apparel and other finished products ................................................ 22.5
autos and equipm ent .......................................................................... 22.9
machinery, except electrical ............................................................ 23.1
printing and publishing .................................................................... 23.8
stone, clay and glass products ........................................................ 24.2
iron and steel products .................................................................... 24.3
lum ber and tim ber .............................................................................. 25.9
transportation equipm ent .................................................................. 26.0
electrical m achinery ............................................................................ 28.4
Source: 28 Barron's No. 16, 3 (1948). It will be noted that the highest
figure shown on the above table is 480% of the lowest.
To check the foregoing tabulation comparable figures (payments to
employees as a percentage of gross receipts) were obtained for several
representative individual firms as follows:
Source:
Corporation Period Labor Cost Annual Re-
port Dated At Page
General Mills ........................ 1947-8 9.2% 30 July '48 2
National Dairy Prod ........... 1947 15.8 4 Mar. '48 8
Gulf Oil .................................. 1947 17.2 21 Apr. '48 9
Socony-Vacuum Oil ............ 1947 18.15 8 Mar. '48 5
Central & South West ........ 1947 21.6 7 Apr. '48 5f
Jersey Central Pwr.
& Light .......................... 1947 23.0 15 Mar. '48 11
Am. Home Products ............ 1947 23.3 5 Mar. '48 11
Std. Oil Co. (N.J.) ....... 1946 23.4 21 Apr. '47 8
Consolidated Ed. of N. Y. .. 1947 26.2 24 Feb. '48 5
Crane Co ............................... 1947 27.5 25 Mar. '48 7
(Continued on next page)
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strange that even friends of trade associations are hesitant to
endorse collective bargaining."5
RELATIONS WITH CUSTOMERS
"Field service"' 6 among customers of an industry, teaching
them to use the products thereof, perhaps with special emphasis
upon safety, 7 is an activity of trade associations. More restrictive
are agreements among merchants limiting the hours during which
sales can be made. Such arrangements have usually been held
lawful, both here 8 and abroad. 9 In the well knowvn Board of Trade
Source:
Corporation Period Labor Cost Annual Re-
port Dated At Page
Pullman, Inc. 1947 28.2 9 Apr. '48 4
Am. Viscose 1947 32.4 10 Mar. '48 5
Allied Laboratories _ 1947 32.5 19 Feb. '48 8
Intrntl. Harvester _ . 1946-7 36.0 31 Oct. '47 7
Bankers' Trust Co. -- 1947 39.5 20 Jan. '48 7, 10
General Electric Co. _ 1947 39.8 12 far. '48 2
Ches. & Ohio Ry. - 1947 42.7 8 Mar. '48 10
Moore Corp. - 1947 482 '48 3
Elgin Nail. Watch .. _ 1947 55.0 21 Feb. '48 9
It will be noted that in the foregoing tabulation the highest figure is 60096
of the lower. Such comparisons suggest the possibility that industry-wide
bargaining might tend more toward price-fixing in some industries than in
others. Compare Oliphant's Studies in Securities [sic, number] 220 (1948).
65. Naylor, op. cit. mipra note 28, at 121 ff.
66. Gott, op. cit. supra note 26, at 1, 5 ff. Trailer Coach Manufacturers'
Ass'n conducts an intensive program of inspecting and approving trailer
parks and facilities. Chicago Journal of Commerce, Sept. 4, 1948, p. 1, col. 5.
Wine Advisory Board publishes a leaflet entitled Recipes [sic] for 9 Cool
Drinks with Wine (1948).
" 67. Farm Equipment Institute carries on a program to promote safety
among farmer customers of the industry. Experience showed that one of the
greatest hazards on the farm was the power shaft driving an implement
from the "power take-off" of the tractor. So that a brand A implement
could be used with a brand B tractor, it was first necessary to standardize
the location of the "take-off' on tractors. Then engineers designed a
standard cover for the power line to protect farmers from harm. Finally,
the Institute promoted the manufacture and distribution of the cover by all
manufacturers. Of course "safety" may be used as a cloak: Chicago Auto-
mobile Trade Association ran a series of advertisements urging the public
not to buy used cars from dealers other than members on the grounds that
the "jalopies" sold by unscrupulous (non-member) dealers were a hazard
on the highways. Members' cars were described as having passed safety
tests. "This campaign is sponsored as a public service... ." Chicago Daily
News, July 30, 1948, p. 12, col. 1-4.
68. Stovall v. McCutchen, 107 Ky. 577, 54 S. W. 969 (1900). Cf.
LaDuc v. Teamsters' Union, (Circuit Court, Racine, Wis. 30 July 1947)
CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 57,631 (1947). T. P. C. Rules, Cotton Converting
Industry, 16 C. F. R- § 110, Rule A; CCH Trade Reg. Serv. ff 20,193
(1939).
69. .Dealq Contracts in Restraint of Trade in French Law, 21 Iowa L.
Rev. 397, 428 n. 69 (1936).
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case7 0 a limitation upon hours of trading at an organized exchange
was sustained. Despite the inconvenience caused a minority71 of
customers it would seem that the restraints were unobjectionable.
They could, of course, be carried to the point of restricting pro-
duction7 2 which would surely infringe the statute. 8
Credit is a sensitive subject about which there has been con-
siderable litigation. Collection of "ledger sheet information" by a
group of sellers who merely release data in response to specific
requests is the simplest form of activity. A second step involves
periodic circulation of such figures in tabulated form. The third
stage involves some element or suggestion of coercion. Either all
sellers agree not to extend further credit to the delinquent, or a
trade association takes on the activities of a collection service ;?4
or the sellers may even agree not to deal with the debtor at all.
Mere collection of credit data and answering of specific re-
quests appears to be both lawful" and desirable.!" Regular publi-
cation of credit information does not seem to have been the sub-
ject of litigation. It must, however, suggest "discretion" in lend-
ing to persons whose credit rating is poor and could be used to
70. Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U. S. 231 (1918); Dunkel
Oil Corp. v. Anich, (E.D. Ill. No. 905, 10 Nov. 1944) CCH Trade Reg.
Serv. 57, 306 (1944) applied the same rule to filling stations; cf. New
York Stock Exchg. Rules, c. 1, § 2: "Dealings upon the Exchange shall be
limited to the hours auring which the Exchange is open for the transaction of
business . . . a fine . . . may be imposed . . . upon any member who shall
make any ... transaction before or after those hours .. "
71. Presumably self-interest would prevent the practice affecting a
large proportion of customers.
72. Cf. National Window Glass Ass'n v. United States, 263 U. S. 403
(1923).
73. See note 121 infra.
74. Gott, op. cit. siupra note 26, at 6 (out of 330 trade associations, 28
operated collection services, 53 systematically reported and exchanged credit
information and 27 published a credit list or directory) ; Gutelius, supra
note 43, at 1. Many associations advocate uniform credit practices. Depart-
ment of Commerce, op. cit. supra note 7, at 110. It is interesting to note
that several prepare financial reports concerning their own members, striking
comparative statements, balance sheet ratios, etc. Gott, mpra at 3.
75. Cement Manufacturers' Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 588, 599
(1925). In United States v. National Peanut Cleaners' Ass'n, (E.D. Va. No.
109, 15 June 1925) § 4 (6) of the decree permitted the association to
"maintain a credit bureau for the sole purpose of furnishing upon specific
request information as to the financial standing of persons and corporations
purchasing or attempting to purchase peanuts, but not to create directly or
by inference a list or class of so-called legitimate . . . dealers. . . ." Ap-
parently Attorney General Daugherty did not object to this function of
trade associations. Jones, supra note 27, at 329.
76. Podell & Kirsch, Credit Bureau Functions of Trade Associatio)ns,
1 St. John's L. Rev. 101, 105 ff. (1927) ; NICB. op. cit. supra note 14, at
152 ff. But see Burns, op. cit. supra note 25, at 47: "The provision of credit
information . . . has developed into efforts to eliminate competition in terms
of credit. . .
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control channels of distribution.7 When coercion of some sort is
involved the authorities are divided. Many judges have approved
agreements not to extend credit to a delinquent customer 8 but the
Supreme Court of the United States appears to have frowned."
A concerted refusal to extend credit to one already heavily in
debt may be efficient: the curb may prevent waste of additional
resources in a poorly managed firm. On the other hand, new enter-
prise frequently needs liberal credit and shutting off the flow of
that commodity may impose the death sentence upon a concern.
It seems impossible to draw distinctions: an agreement not to
extend credit to a dishonest debtor is just as objectionable as any
other. For the whole question is whether the debtor is dishonest,
or the debt really exists. Honest disputes are common to the
course of trade and concerted action by sellers may effectively
deprive a customer of his day in court.8 0 For such reasons it would
seem preferable to entrust most credit activities to commercial
77. "So-called credit bureaus of associations . . . have repeatedly been
used as indirect black lists or white lists to control the channels of distribu-
tion and prevent direct sales to consumers or others." Jones, supra note 27,
at 185. Cf. Department of Commerce, op. cit. supra note 7, at 117 ff.
78. Delz v. Winfree, Norman & Pearson, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 11, 25 S. W.
30 (1894) ; Reynolds v. Plumbers' Protective Ass'n, 30 Misc. 709, 63 N. Y.
Supp. 303 (1900), aff'd, 169 N. Y. 614, 62 N. E. 1100 (1902) (special
statute) ; United States v. Fur Dressers' Ass'n, 5 F. 2d 869 (S.D. N.Y.
1925) (good opinion, see 870 ff.) ; see Brewster v. Miller, 101 Ky. 369, 376, 41
S. W. 301, 303 (1897) ; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 394
(1905) ; Woodhouse v. Powles, 43 Wash. 617, 621, 86 Pac. 1063, 1065 (1906) ;
United States v. King, 229 Fed. 275, 278 (D. Mass. 1915); United States
v. Southern Grocers Ass'n, 7 F. 2d 944, 948 (S.D. Cal. 1925); Hartman v.
Hyman & Lieberman, 287 Pa. 78, 86, 134 Adt. 486, 489 (1926). Cf. Schulten
v. Bavarian Brewing Co., 96 Ky. 224, 28 S. W. 504 (1894) (plaintiff should
have alleged that he did not owe the money).
79. United States v. First National Pictures, 282 U. S. 44 (1930).
Accord, Harnett v. Plumbers' Supply Ass'n, 169 Mass. 229, 47 N. E. 1002
(1897) ; Ferd. Heim Brewing Co. v. Belinder, 97 Mo. App. 64, 71 S. "W. 691
(1903) ; United States v. Alexander & Reid Co., 280 Fed. 924 (S.D. N.Y.
1922). The First National Picture case involved an agreement not to deal
with new owners of theatres (without a cash deposit) who refused to be-
come liable for the debts of the vendors. In the lower court the arrangement
was found not unreasonable, the court declaring that serious trade abuses
had thus been eliminated without any attempt to monopolize. 34 F. 2d 815,
818 ff. (S.D. N.Y. 1929). As pointed out in the brief for the United States
in the Supreme Court the effect of the credit agreement was to compel
one man to pay the debts of another. See pp. 13, 20. On that basis can one
distinguish such cases as United States v. Fur Dressers' Ass'n; see, Kirsh
& Shapiro, Trade Associations in Law and Business 178 (1938). See generally
Podell & Kirsh, supra note 76, at 106 ff. A concerted refusal to deal with
a debtor may have other consequences. McIntyre v. Weinert, 195 Pa. 52, 45
At. 666 '(1900) (libel); Kirsh & Shapiro, supra at 171 (actionable con-
spiracy).
80. "A combination fraught with such consequences ... is necessarily
vexatious, harmful and bad on grounds of public policy." Bracken, Trade
Organiyation for the Collection of Debts Due Members by M!eans of Boy-
cott, 39 Am. L. Reg. (N.S.) 691, 713 (1900). This is the point so badly
overlooked in Schulten v. Bavarian Brewing Co., 96 Ky. 224, 28 S. W. 504
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agencies not directly representative of particular groups of sellers.81
Competitors may jointly prepare standard forms of contract 2
Inevitably such standardization involves a measure of uniformity
in terms of sale. Questions of terminology must be agreed upon
and standardized contracts may thus freeze definitions.83 Many
other matters, such as returns of merchandise,8 4 service facilities8-
and guarantees86 are often included. Theoretically a standard con-
tract could be drawn with many blanks to fill in. Rates of discount
and the like could thus be inserted by parties to specific transac-
tions. Indeed, several optional clauses could be provided for each
part of the agreement, the users to strike out those superfluous to
(1894). Cf. Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 413 (1915) (hear-
ing may not be denied because citizen believed not to have a case).
81. Four textile and one automobile trade associations placed credit
problems in the hands of a commercial agency. Department of Commerce,
op. cit. upra note 7, at 120. It is said that the associations are better equipped
to deal with credit problems. Podell & Kirsh, supra note 76, at 127. But
credit activities have sometimes been urged as a means of restricting pro-
duction. Biddle, Trade Associatioi' Part in Bettering Credit, 11 Proc. Am.
Trade Ass'n Exs. 183 (1930).
82. Department of Commerce, op. cit. supra note 7, at 110; Note, 40
Yale L. J. 640, 644 n. 17 (1931) ; Gott, op. cit. supra note 26, at 11. It also
appears that some associations prepare standard catalogues or inserts there-
for. Id. at 7. T. P. C. Fabricators of Structural Steel, 16 C. F. R. § 26 rule
B, CCH Trade Reg. Serv. 20,109 (1931). Rules of the National Poultry,
Butter & Egg Ass'n provided for a "frame of reference" contract, specify-
ing a standard form for confirmation of orders, regulations regarding
goods damages in transit, inspection of quality and the like. Lee, op. cit.
suepra note 14, at 217 ff. A group of associations in the textile field developed
a uniform "sales note" in 1932. Association of Cotton Textile Merchants of
New York, Twenty-five Years 38 ff. (1944). Apparently banks agree upon
the mechanics of collecting items for credit. First National Bank of Chicago,
Letter to customers (February 9, 1948) (signed by E. E. Schmus, vice-
president and cashier). As every tenant knows, by one means or another, all
landlords offer a uniform lease, if any.
83. Department of Commerce, op. cit. supra note 7, at 110. National
Hardwood Lumber Association published a "code" which inter alia, defined
terms, prescribed methods of shipment, means of cancelling orders, etc.
Associated Wooden Ware Manufacturers adopted a code of ethics setting
forth uniform terms and conditions of sale. Lee, op. cit. supra note 14, at
192 ft.
84. Department of Commerce, op. cit. supra note 7, at 110; Naylor,
op. cit. supra note 28, at 102; T. P. C. Doll & Stuffed Toy Industry, 12 F. R.
4225, 16 C. F. R. § 173, 101 (rule A group 2), CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 1
20,256 (1947).
85. T. P. C. Hearing Aid Industry, 16 C. F. R. § 159, rule C (group
2), CCH Trade Reg. Serv. ff 20,242 (1944).
86. T. P. C. Artificial Limb Industry, 11 F. R. 4144, 16 C. F. R. §
165.8, CCH Trade Reg. Serv. ff 20,248 (1946).
Rules of the Binders' Board Manufacturers Association set forth the
permissible amount of discount (2') for payment within 15 days of ship-
ment. Automotive Equipment Association rules specified that interest of
not less than 7% should be charged on overdue amounts. Rules of the
Association of Ice Cream Supply Men prohibited "commercial bribery of
customers by money, long term credits not in keeping with trade custom, ex-
cessive entertaining or any other means." Lee, op. cit. supra note 14, at 205,
234, 238 ff.
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their needs. As a practical matter, however, such devices do not
appear often to be utilized.
In the well known case of Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v.
United States8 7 it appeared that the producers of some sixty per
cent of the motion pictures made in the United States agreed upon
a standard form of contract to offer to exhibitors. Perhaps the
most important feature of the contract required the parties to
arbitrate differences betveen them. If an exhibitor refused to
comply with the arbitration requirement, all producers were to
boycott him. The contract was held unlawful, the court declaring
that the public interest in the maintenance of competition con-
stituted a consideration before which the advantages of such private
arrangements must yield.88
'Standardized contracts, particularly those which provide a
"frame of reference" for individual transactions, must be of great
assistance-to the orderly march of commerce. As every lawyer
knows, a well considered standardized contract (if properly adapt-
ed to the situation at hand) can save much confusion and litiga-
tion."9 Forms accepted throughout an industry clarify crucial terms
of trade. It is possible, however, to use standardized forms for
harmful purposes.90
87. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U. S. 30
(1930).
88. Id. at 44. An observer declared: "If the language of Air. Justice
McReynolds be taken literally, it is open to question whether the decision
prohibits only those standard contract clauses embodying compulsory arbi-
tration or standard contracts in general. At any rate the severely practical
result of the opinion is that a vast deal of the constructive work to which
trade associations have been devoting their energies for the past decade has
been jeopardized... ." Note, 40 Yale L. J. 640, 643 (1931). Accord, United
States v. Sugar Institute, Inc., 297 U. S. 553 (1936) (elimination of long-
term deliveries of sugar); see Fly, Observations on the Antitrust Laws;
Economic Theory and the Sugar Institute Decisions, 46 Yale L. J. 228,
249 ff. (1936); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106(1911), 1 D. & J. in A. T. Cases 157, 188 (S.D. N.Y. 1911) ; United States
v. New Departure Mfg. Co., 204 Fed. 107, 1 D. & J. 471, 474 (W.D. N.Y.
1913) (terms of credit) ; United States v. Kluge, 1 D. & J. 631, 634 (S.D.
N.Y. 1917). In United States v. Dried Fruit Ass'n, 4 F. R. D. 1 (N.D. Cal.
1944) the court apparently took the position (at 9) that numerous standardi-
zation practices were lawful because not shown to have affected prices. Cf.
Columbia Pictures Corp. v. Bi-Metallic Investment Co., 42 F. 2d 873 (D. Colo.
1930) (question raised but not reached). Apparently the Trade Commis-
sion once eliminated T. P. C. rules encouraging standardized contracts.
Myers, Revision of the Trade Practice Conference Rules by the Federal
Trade Cominission, 11 Proc. Am. Trade Ass'n Exs. 165, 174 (1930).
89. Foth, op. cit. supra note 15, at 164 ff.
90. Guarantees against price declines may affect price structures. An
agreement fixing minimum credit standards may freeze out would-be buyers.
NICB, op. cit. supra note 14, at 153-55, 203 ff.; Jones, supra note 27, at 183.
Query whether a standard form of contract is usually fair to customers who
take no part in its preparation.
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One form of standardized terms-the agreement to use the
"basing-point" method of computing freight costs-has been the
subject of special attention. For many years the Trade Commission
has attacked the basing-point practicer1 finally achieving apparent
victory.12 Interestingly enough, the Commission's triumph was
recorded in a decision involving an agreement among competitors
to use basing points.13 Basing point pricing by individuals may
still be lawful under some circumstances. 4
Competitors sometimes seek to narrow channels of distribu-
tion. Perhaps most typical is an agreement by wholesalers to boy-
cott manufacturers who sell directly to retailers (the war against
the chain stores)." In many other ways groups of competitors
have sought to restrict markets and to eliminate distributors
thought to be undesirable.9 6 A conspiracy to boycott for such a
91. United States Steel Corp., 8 F. T. C. 1 (1924) ; Montague, Recent
Developments in Trade Association Law, 139 Annals 38, 42 (1928) (T.P.C.
rules in shirting fabrics industry).
92. F. T. C. v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746 (1945) ; F. T. C.
v. Cement Institute, 333 U. S. 683 (1948). After announcement of the last
cited decision the U. S. Steel Corp. at last abandoned the basing point
system. Chicago Journal of Commerce, July 8, 1948, p. 1, col. 8.
93. The Commission's case against the Cement Institute (note 92
supra) was not based upon section 1 of the Sherman Act over which the
Commission has no jurisdiction, but upon section 2 of the Clayton Act and sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
94. Zlinkoff & Barnard, Basing Points and Quantity Discounts, 48 Col.
L. Rev. 985 (1948) ; Head, Validity under the Robinson-Patina.i Act of a
Uniform Delivered Price of One Seller, 31 Minn. L. Rev. 599 (1947). As to
merits of the basing point practice, consult Fetter, Masquerade of Monopoly
(1931) ; Burns, op. cit. supra note 25, at 290 ff.; Fetter, New Plea for Basing
Point Monopoly, 45 J. Pol. Econ. 577 (1937) ; de Chazeau, Public Policy and
Discriminatory Prices of Steel, 46 J. Pol. Econ. 537 (1938) ; Evans, An
Inquiry into the Legality of the Basing Point System in the Steel Indnstry,
25 Va. L. Rev. 890 (1939); Federal Trade Commission, Basing Point
System in the Steel Industry (1935) ; Note, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 548 (1932)
55 Yale L. J. 558 (1946) ; 42 Ill. L. Rev. 364 (1947) ; 33 Minn. L. Rev. 283.
95. TNEC, op. cit. supra note 21, at 345 ff. Much legislation has been
employed in the battle against the chains. E.g., Robinson-Patman Act, 49
Stat. 1526 (1926), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1946). Collins, Anti-Chain Store Legis-
lation, 24 Corn. L. Q. 198 (1939). Lee, Anti-Chain Store Tax Legislation
(1939). Cf. Wilcox, Competition and Monopoly in American Industry 56
ff. (TNEC monograph 21, 1940) ; United States v. New York Great A. & P.
Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ill. 1946).
96. ". . . if any one ... skips the next logical step [in distribution]
and sells over the head of his recognized purchaser to that purchaser's
customer, he engages in a practice which is unfair. . . Most [trade] as-
sociations bar from association membership concerns which exercise im-
proper functions." Naylor, op. cit. supra note 28, at 101. Rules of the
National Association of Retail Grocers contained a strong statement in
favor of "established" methods of distribution and against "so-called more
direct methods." Rules of Associated Metal Lath Manufacturers: "9. No
metal lath salesman shall cooperate in bringing about contracts for the
covering of metal lath by other than reputable contractors whose work will
be permanent and a credit to the metal lath industry." Of the National
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purpose is, of course, illegal.97
Any understanding affecting the customers of a group of
competitors may reduce the service rendered by the parties there-
to. The law recognizes competition in service as well as in price.0,
Such competition may be of considerable importance when prices
are sticky.99 On the other hand, if price competition is vigorous,
standardization of the other aspects of transactions is desirable in
that it facilitates price comparisons.
CONTROL OF COMPETITORS
Traders desire to compete on equal terms. Thus efforts to
eliminate unfair trade practices may become the subject of con-
certed action by competitors. When a minority in an industry con-
ducts itself in a manner which appears unfair to the majority,
"'codes of ethics" are promulgated and other steps taken in an
attempt to place all competitors upon a plane.100
A first step may consist merely of an effort to enforce existing
law. One group, for example, solemnly declared that
Hardware Association: "It is not within the wholesaler's function to quote
prices to consumers. All sales to consumers should be made through the
legitimate retail merchant." Lee, op. cit. supra note 14, at 257, 223. 252.
Note use of the words "recognized," "established," "reputable" and "legiti-
mate": they are typical of attempts to narrow channels of distribution.
97. Handler, supra note 3, at 45 ff. Compare the problem of "clear-
ance" by which a motion picture exhibitor through contract with the
distributor protects itself from exhibition of the same film by competing
theaters for a limited time. In its latest decisions the Supreme Court indi-
cated that such a clearance arrangement is illegal if established by con-
certed action among distributors or exhibitors, or by exercise of the
bargaining power of a chain of theaters in a monopolistic position, or if the
clearance agreed upon between a single distributor and exhibitor is greater
in area or duration than is reasonably necessary to protect the interests of
the exhibitor. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U. S. 131 (1948):
Schine Chain Theatres v. United States, 334 U. S. 110 (1948) ; cf. Westvay
Theater v. Twentieth Century Fox Corp., 30 F. Supp. 830 (D.D.C. 1940) ;
St. Louis Amusement Co. v. Paramount Corp., 168 F. 2d 988 (8th Cir.
1948).
98. See United States v. Union Pacific Ry., 226 U. S. 61. 87 ff. (1912):
"Competition between two such [railroad] systems consists not only in mak-
ing rates . . . but includes the character of the service rendered, the ac-
commodation of the shipper in handling and caring for freight and the
prompt recognition and adjustment of the shipper's claims." See also United
States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 224 U. S. 383, 393 (1912); United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 53 Fed. 440. 452 (C.C.D. Kan.
1892) ; Jones, =pra note 27, at 260.
99. Till, The Fiction of the Quoted Price, 4 Law & Contemp. Prob.
363, 364 (1937).
100. Controlling "trade practices" is an important activity of trade
associations. Within that term is included combatting unfair advertising.
development of codes of ethics, trade terminology and the like. Gott. of,. cit.
nprna note 26, at 1, 11 (245 out of 330 associations so engaged). In addition to
the instances of control over competitors considered in this section, others
ostensibly aimed at protection of consumers are analyzed infra pp. 374 ff.
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"Contracts, either written or oral, are business obligations
which should be performed in letter and spirit. The repudiation of
contracts by sellers on a rising market, or by buyers on a declin-
ing market, is equally reprehensible, and is condemned by the
industry."'01
However presumptuous and unnecessary an agreement to obey the
law may be, no question of its legality appears to have been
raised.1
0 2
Protection of trade marks and trade names carries law enforce-
ment only slightly farther. Trade associations operate registers of
such symbols'0 3 and agree not to violate the mark of others.104
Commercial organizations perform a similar function'0 5 but it is
arguable that industry-wide groups can do a better job since their
101. T. P. C. Southern Mixed Feed Manufacturers, 16 C. F. R. § 27,
Rule A (group 2), CCH Trade Reg. Serv. 1 20,110 (1931). Cf. T. P. C.
Fabricators of Structural Steel, 16 C. F. R. § 26.2, CCH Trade Reg. Serv.
ff 20,109 (1931) (forbids using methods of erectioa prohibited by local
law). As to the effect of the Sugar Institute case in this field, see Donovan,
The Effect of the Decision in the Sugar Institute Case upon Trade Associa-
tion Activities, 84 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 929, 939 ff. (1936): "The opinion sus-
tains the view that an agreement to eliminate a practice that is unfair within
the meaning of established law ... would not be questioned if limited to tile
accomplishment of that one purpose." Obviously such resolutions indicate dis-
satisfaction with our judicial process.
102. Agreements among competitors have sought to eliminate various
forms of attempts to monopolize. T. P. C. Common Brick Industry, 16
C. F. R. § 25.4, CCH Trade Reg. Serv. g1 20,108 (1931) (sales below cost
with tendency to create monopoly, etc.) ; T. P. C. Low Pressure Refrigerants
Industry, 10 F. R. 7968, 16 C. F. R. § 164.11, CCH Trade Reg. Serv. 1
20,247 (1945) (shipment upon consignment for purpose of clogging trade
outlets) ; T. P. C. Piston Ring Industry, 11 F. R. 7658, 16 C. F. R. § 166.10,
CCH Trade Reg. Serv. ff 20,250 (1946) (buying stocks of competitors'
goods from dealers, etc., in order to secure exclusive sales outlet) ; Eddy,
op. cit. supra note 12, at 79 ("cooperative" action against tying clauses,
local price cutting, etc.) ; T. P. C. Doll and Stuffed Toy Industry, 12 F. R.
4225, 16 C. F. R. § 173.3, CCH Trade Reg. Serv. 20,256 (1947); Lee,
op. cit. supra note 14, at 242 (rules of Corset Manufacturers' Association
against price discriminations in form of advertising listing names of dealers).
Apparently the Sugar Institute was attempting to enforce § 2 of the
Clayton Act. United States v. Sugar Institute, Inc., 297 U. S. 553 (1936).
103. Foth, op. cit. .rpra note 15, at 296 ff.; Jones, 4wpra note 27, at 187
ff.; Gott, op. cit. supra note 26, at 4. Some groups presume to "grant" rights
to use marks. Naylor, op. cit. supra note 28, at 129 ff. According to Article
14 of its by-laws (April 7, 1922, as amended) the Board of Directors of
the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., may make provisions:
"(a) In relation to the registration with the Association of titles for motion
pictures .... (b) In relation to the avoidance of harmfully conflicting use
of titles; and (c) For the settlement by arbitration or conciliation of dis-
putes in respect of the matters described in (b) above ......
104. T. P. C. Paper Bag Industry, 16 C. F. R. § 24.2, CCH Trade
Reg. Serv. g 20,107 (1931).
105. The federal Patent Office maintains no record of unregistered
marks. 11 F. R. 177A-333, 37 C. F. R. § 10.25 (b) (1946).
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concern is but a single trade.10 6 In approaching the field of com-
mercial torts, however, competitors set foot on softer terrain. Com-
mercial bribery, often the focus of group activity,' is probably
unlawful either at common law or under the Trade Commission
Act.108 No doubt enticement of employees in breach of contract
falls in the same category.10 9
But difficulties are surely encountered when traders under-
take to provide their own definitions of commercial torts. Efforts
to stamp out "style piracy" constitute an example. Women's
fashions, whose designs were not protected by patent or copy-
right, were widely imitated. As a consequence, designers lost part
of the benefit of their original work. Accordingly boycotts were
organized against the style "pirates." Although several courts'1
and perhaps the Commission itself " approved such protective
106. Unfair competition is largely an industry-wide problem. But cf.
Callman, Unfair Competition without Competition? The Importance of the
Property Concept in, the Law of Trade-Marks, 95 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 443
(1947).
107. NICB, op. cit. supra note 14, at 198, Department of Commerce,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 110. Some sixty associations sponsored the Com-
mercial Standards Council wluch promoted federal legislation against
bribery, developed higher commercial standards and eliminated "harmful
business practices.' May, supra note 26, at 94. Commercial bribery is de-
nounced m T. P. C. Public Seating Industry, 16 C. F. R. § 20.6, CCH Trade
Reg. Serv. f 20,103 (1939).
108. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commssion Act, 38 Stat. 717
(1914), 15 U. S. C. § 45 (1946), as amended. The Commission's definition
of the term "commercial bribery" to mean payments to an employee of a
customer has achieved general acceptance. See American Distilling Co. v.
Wisconsin Liquor Co., 104 F. 2d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 1939). Cf. T. P. C.
Mason Waterproofing Industry, 16 C. F. R. § 169.13, CCH Trade Reg.
Serv. [ 20,251 (1946) (obtaining confidential information by bribing em-
ployee of competitor condemned).
109. Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., By-laws, Article
14, T. P. C. Steel Office Furniture Industry, 16 C. F. R. § 21.5, CCH Trade
Reg. Serv. 20,104 (1931). In baseball, major league rule 3 (h) provides:
"To preserve discipline and competition, and to prevent the enticement of
players ... there shall be no negotiations respecting employment . . be-
tween any player ... and any club other than the club with which he is
under contract... "' Note the prohibition upon all negotiations. Rule 5 (e)
fixes a schedule of prices to be paid by a major league club for the assign-
ment of a contract of a player m an inferior league. The figures, grouped
by class of club, range from $1,500 to $10,000.
Rules against inducing breach of contract between a competitor and
his customer are also found. T. P C. Kraft Paper Industry, 16 C. F R.
§ 22.1, CCH Trade Reg. Serv. 20,105 (1931). Defamation of competitors is
forbidden in T. P. C. Milk & Ice Cream Can Industry, 16 C. F. R. § 23.4,
CCH Trade Reg. Serv. ff 20,106 (1931).
110. Win. Filene Sons' Co. v. Fashion Guild, 90 F 2d 556 (1st Cir.
1937); Wolfenstein v. Fashion Guild, 244 App. Div. 656, 280 N. Y. Supp.
361 (1935) ; Note, 26 Va. L. Rev. 828 (1940).
111. Foth, op. cit. supra note 15, at 111, Montague, op. cit. mipra note
91, at 42; T. P. C. Milk & Ice Cream Can Industry, 16 C. F. R. § 23, rule C
(group 2), CCH Trade Reg. Serv. ff 20,106 (1931).
1949]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
measures, the Federal Trade Commission finally called a halt.11 2
Style piracy is not an attractive business practice. It would seem
preferable, however, to amend the copyright laws rather than to
leave protection to private powers. Unofficial groups cannot be
permitted to make substantive law.113
Agreements to restrain the "unfair" conduct of competitors
lead to enforcement programs.1 1 4 Thus a "defendant" may be
"tried" and "convicted" without benefit of the judiciary: the
guarantees of due process of law are abridged. But that considera-
112. Fashion Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U. S. 457 (1941);
Note, 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 987 (1941).
113. Thus, in the Fashion Guild case, note 112 supra, the Supreme
Court stressed that (at 466) : ". . . The combination exercised sufficient
control ... to exclude from the industry those manufacturers and distributors
who do not conform to the rules and regulations of said respondents. .. ."
It should be noted that the defendants in the Fashion Guild ease had
also agreed not to advertise at retail, not to sell at retail, to regulate days
for special sales, to restrict discounts and to control fashion shows. At
least some of the foregoing agreements were invalid under prior decisions
and their existence may have influenced the court.
Another example of dubious action is the campaign against "free"
goods. Thus the National Association of Piano Merchants of America, rule
7: "This Association condemns advertising as "FREE" articles included in
the purchase price of the instrument, such as bench, scarf, etc."
Rules of National Association of Retail Grocers: "We believe gift
schemes, trading stamps and coupons of all kinds are detrimental to good
merchandising and deceptive to the public."
Lee, op. cit. supra note 14, at 253, 259: Naylor, op. cit. supra note 28,
at 174; cf. Standard Education Society v. F. T. C., 302 U. S. 112 (1937)
(Commission's attack on practice approved). "Free" goods constitute a
method of price reduction; the "free deal" is particularly used as a method
of pricing in monopolistic industries in which the formal price remains
fixed. Lyon, The Economics of Free Deals 45 ff. (1933). Until such prices
become more flexible the wisdom of prohibiting "deals" must remain open
to question.
Rules of the National Association of Piano Merchants of America:
"6. This Association condemns advertising of private sales at residence
addresses and places not recognized as regular trade locations." Lee, op. cit.
supra note 14, at 253. Note the phrase, "places not recognized."
Rules of the National Association of Retail Grocers contained a strong
statement in favor of retail price maintenance. Lee, supra at 258. But in
United States v. Tennessee Retail Grocers' Ass'n, (M.D. Tenn. No. 10,116,
2 Nov. 1941) § 54 of an indictment alleged that the defendant indeVendent
retail grocers had organized a trade association to fix and raise prices, to
procure passage of state retail price maintenance legislation and then to
"police" and enforce that measure by threatening prosecution, etc. In United
States v. Connecticut Food Council, Inc., (D. Conn. No. 680, 5 Nov. 1941)§ 3 (9) of a consent decree enjoined similar defendants from agreeing to
"Enforce the Unfair Sales Practices Act through threat of litigation or
other coercive activity. . . ." Cf. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups,
51 Harv. L. Rev. 201, 239 ff. (1937).
114. "As far as possible, associations aim to police their own trades
and to discipline their own members." Foth, op. cit. supra note 15, at 118.
Apparently the Paperboard Industries Association had an elaborate system
of committees and inspectors to enforce its T. P. C. rules. Id. at 122. A
National Better Business Bureau was utilized by some industries, especially
the advertising trade. Id. at 119.
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lion alone will not condemn group action. For the Supreme Court
has announced:
"Designed to frustrate unreasonable restraints they [the anti-
trust laws] do not prevent the adoption of reasonable means to
protect interstate commerce from destructive or injurious prac-
tices and to promote competition upon a sound basis. Voluntary
action to end abuses and to foster competitive opportunities in the
public interest may be more effective than legal processes. And
cooperative endeavor may appropriately have wider objectives than
merely the removal of evils which are infractions of positive
law... "5
Despite the liberality suggested by the foregoing declaration, it is
difficult to believe that courts are ready to countenance extensive
extrajudicial programs of law enforcement. Perhaps groups of
competitors should be empowered to apply simply the penalty of
expulsion from a trade association. In view of their tendency to
create new substantive rules 1 and the requirements of due
process suggested above," 7 further enforcement powers would
seem dangerous.
RELATIONS AFFECTING CONSUMERS
Some activities affecting customers of competitors have been
discussed. There remain courses of conduct which may cast burdens
not only upon the immediate customers but also upon ultimate
consumers as a group. Even those practices which do not directly
impinge upon customers may be onerous to the general public.
Several types of agreements are easily disposed of. Agreements
not to compete are, of course, invalid unless "ancillary" to another
transaction." s Any sharing of markets or division of territory "
115. United States v. Sugar Institute, Inc., 297 U. S. 553, 597 ff.
(1936). As to the last sentence quoted, cf. Fashion Guild v. F. T. C., 312
U. S. 457 (1941).
116. See illustrations cited note 113 supra.
117. Cf. Wilcox v. Supreme Council, 210 N. Y. 370, 104 N. E. 624
(1914) (expulsion from private association).
118. As to the scope of ancillary contracts consult Restatement, Con-
tracts § 516 (1933) ; Handler, Restraint of Trade, 13 Encyc. Soc. Si. 339 ff.
(1934) ; Kales, Contracts and Combinations in Restraint of Trade §§ 16,113
(1918). For the origin and scope of the doctrine see Taft, J., in United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 280 ff. (6th Cir. 1898).
Cf. Carpenter, Validity of Contracts not to Compete, 76 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
244, 257 (1928); McNair, Agreements in Restraint of Trade, 4 Economica
176 (1924) (Great Britain) ; Deak, op. cit. mpra note 69, at 402 ff.
119. Unreported examples: rules of American Face Brick Associa-
tion: "Refrain from all further solicitation after a competitor has secured
either an adoption or an order. . . ." Lee, op. cit. mpra note 14, at 234. Rule
1 (c) of the major leagues (baseball) : "To preserve and stimulate com-
petition for the League Pennants and for the World Championship, the
circuits thus established shall remain unchanged either by withdrawal from
a city, by inclusion of another city, or by consolidation of clubs within a
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is similarly beyond the pale.120 Agreements to fix prices are tin-
lawful per se.'21 And by reason of the constant efforts of groups of
competitors to arrive at an understanding which will lift the bur-
den of free prices122 it is equally well established that restriction
city, unless in any case the change is approved by a majority of clubs in
each league . . . the circuit of either Major League shall not be changed
to include any city in the circuit of the other Major League except by the
unanimous consent of the clubs constituting both Major Leagues." Rule
1 (a) of the major-minor leagues: "No territory in which a Minor League
franchise is being operated under protection of the Major-Minor League
Agreement . . . shall be included in any Major League until such Minor
League and Minor League Clubs shall be paid such compensation as shall
be mutually agreed upon as just and reasonable compensation for such
action."
An observer points out that, perhaps as a result of such agreements,
St. Louis and Boston each have two baseball clubs while Detroit has only
one. But Detroit has a greater population than the other two cities com-
bined. He concludes that the agreements ". . . enable those who are 'in'
baseball . . . to administer the game as a closed corporation, and to ex-
clude at will from their ranks those who are 'out' . . . new team participation
or club expansion in the major leagues is a practical impossibility ... "
Neville, Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 16 Ford. L. Rev. 208, 209 ff. (1947).
120. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 497 (1940);
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392, 396 (1947) ; Handler,
supra note 3, at 17 ff. Even a labor union cannot combine with employers
to exclude competitors from a market. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local, 325 U. S.
797 (1945). "That organized baseball is a monopoly, there can be little
doubt," was Neville's conclusion, supra note 119, at 211. He relies on
American League Club v. Chase, note 59 supra. But does it involve inter-
state trade or commerce within the terms of the Sherman Act? See note
60 supra.
121. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 218
(1940) ; United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U. S. 707, 720 (1944);
Handler, supra note 3, at 9 ff.
122. A few random selections will suffice to supplement the reported
cases. From 1904 on trade associations in the lumber industry were busy
with price-fixing schemes. James, Restrictive Agreements and Practices in
the Lumber Industry, 13 So. Econ. J. 115, 118 ff. (1946). Rules of the
Motorcycle and Allied Trades Association, Inc., provided: "4. The manufac-
turer should scrupulously avoid price cutting without regard to costs or to the
lowering of profits in the industry to dangerous levels."
Lee, op. cit. supra note 14, at 275. In August 1939 a non-profit mem-
bership corporation was formed under the laws of California called Central
California Wineries, Inc. "The purpose of C. C. W. I. was to aid in
[633] financing wineries by stabilizing prices in the wine industry."
Acampo Winery, Inc., 7 T. C. 629, 632 ff. (1946). In the hotel business
it has been said: "A great deal of the old policies of convention-soliciting
has disappeared thanks largely to the firm attitude of the American Hotel
Association, which has always disapproved of such practices as special
room rates, free suites for association executives and free banquet facilities."
American Hotel Association, 21 Operations Bulletin No. 9, 2 (1948).
Illinois has a vigorously phrased anti-price fixing statute. Act of
June 11, 1891, § 1, L. 1891, p. 206, Rev. Stat. c. 38, § 569 (1947). But cf.
Note, The Illinois Antitrust Law Disinterred, 43 Ill. L. Rev. 205, 217 ff.(1948).
Borderline cases present problems too numerous to consider here.
For example, rule 1 of the Corset Manufacturers' Association of the
United States forbade a member to make a "gift" to a customer of a
mirror, counter, show case, board or wire sign, etc. Lee, op. cit. supra note
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of production,123 joint selling schemes, "' restraints upon dis-
14, at 242. Trade associations are urged to foster "intelligent cooperative
competition" (as the ideal substitute for "cut-throat competition") through
exchange of cost data, good fellowship, etc. It has even been suggested that
associations should organize branch groups of competitors' salesmen so that
they will not believe customers' false tales of price cuts by others and
therefore will maintain prices. Naylor, op. cit. supra note 28, at 278 ff.
Gott found as late as 1938 that 52 out of 330 associations were engaged in
"Cost estimating." "Developing procedures for use in the preparation of
cost estimates for bids or other-wise" Op. cit. supra note 26, at 3.
It is not without significance that socialists and economic planners
also hold "morbid fears" of a free price system. Jewkes, op. cit. supra
note 61, at 112.
123.. Handler, supra note 3, at 14 f; Carman, Lawful Combinations ill
Restraint of Trade, 12 Minn. L. Rev. 341 (1928).Dubious variations are legion. A trade association in the paper con-
tainer industry fostered an agreement to limit production to five days a
week, the sixth being reserved for repairs. A limitation on the length of
shifts was also involved. The Secretary of Labor is said to have approved
the scheme. NICB, op. ,cit. supra note 14, at 269 ff. Gott found 15 asso-
ciations engaged in "Scrapping of used equipment. Maintaining organized
plans or procedure for scrapping or destroying uneconomic or obsolete
machinery, equipment, etc." And 106 active in "Stabilization of Business.
Formulating suggestive procedures with reference to the reduction of
fluctuations and the adverse effects resulting therefrom." op. cit. supra note
26, at 9. Cf. Drucker, Concept of the Corporation 222 (1946) (approving
restrictive activities which tend to smooth out cyclical fluctuations) ; Jewkes,
op. cit. supra note 61, at-46 ff.
124. Pocahontas Coke Co. v. Powhattan Coal Co., 60 W. Va. 508, 56
S. E. 264 (1906) ; but cf. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S.
344 (1933), described as "a trip into cartel territory." Levi, The Antitrust
Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 153, 173 (1947). Gott found
12 associations engaged in cooperative marketing: "Actually selling com-
modities or services of the industry... through joint action," op. cit. supra
note 26, at 7. Flotation of securities by "syndicates" of investment bankers
has recently been challenged. United States v. Morgan, (S.D. N.Y. No.
43-737, 1947). In aviation, an industry which enjoys the blessings of govern-
mental supervision, competition raised its head, whereupon ". . . the
certificated airlines responded to the challenge of the independents by estab-
lishing a joint cargo shipping organization, Air Cargo, Inc., which has
been sanctioned by the C. A. B. and thereby removed from the purview of the
antitrust laws" Note, 57 Yale L. J. 1053, 1070 (1948). Cooperative sale of
by-products may also be common. Gutelius, supra note 43, at 39.
Conservation of natural resources has often been encouraged (with
a view to limiting production?) Gott, op. cit. supra note 26, at 3. Oil is
a good example. In that industry the question of the application of anti-
trust laws to arrangements for the cooperative e.xploitation of individual
pools has long been active. Myers, Relationi of the Federal Antitrust Laws to
the Problem of Mineral Conser-vation, 55 A.B.A. Rep. 672, 674 (1930). An
observer recently declared: "It is true that unitization [combining several
tracts for single exploitation of an oil field as a joint venture] is a form
of cooperative activity, but if its primary and real objectives are the pre-
vention of waste and protection of the correlative rights in the pool rather
than the controlling of prices and restricting of competition, it does not
seem that such activity is proscribed. .. "
King, Pooling and Unitication of Oil and Gas Leases, 46 Mich. L. Rev.
311, 326 (1948). Accord, Jacobs, Unit Operation of Oil and Gas Fields,
57 Yale L. J. 1207, 1217 ff. (1948). But cf. United States v. Cotton Valley
Committee, 77 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. La. 1948).
In the export trade group selling was made lawful by the Webb-
Pomerene Act, 40 Stat. 516 (1918), 15 U. S. C. §§ 61 ff. (1946). Consult
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counts' 25 and the like are intolerable. When judges suspect that a
plan of cooperation among competitors affects prices they tend to
brush aside explanations:
"Pious protestations and smug preambles but intensify distrust
when men are found busy with schemes to enrich themselves
through circumvention. 1
-8
Exchanges and Trade Association Statistical Activities
Far more complex are the problems raised by exchange of
statistics and "open-price" plans. We should first consider or-
ganized exchanges. Members of an exchange formed to facilitate
dealings in a particular commodity are subject to rigorous re-
strictions. Their numbers are limited, 12 7 non-members are ex-
cluded, 12 8 the time and place of trading are fixed,"29 and it is not
uncommon to control the rate of commissions. 30 Somewhat sur-
prisingly, courts look with favor upon such arrangements:
"From very early times it has been the custom for men engaged
in the occupation of buying and selling articles of a similar nature
at any particular place to associate themselves together. The ob-
ject of the association has in many cases been to provide for the
ready transaction of the business of the associates by obtaining a
Diamond, The Webb-Ponzerene Act and Export Trade Associations, 44
Col. L. Rev. 805 (1944).
Nothing in the antitrust laws forbids the existence and operation of
labor, agricultural or horticultural organizations, instituted for purposes
of mutual help. Section 6, Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 17
(1946). Persons engaged in the production of agricultural products may
act together in associations and may have marketing agencies in common.
Section 1 of the Capper-Volstead Act, 42 Stat. 388 (1922), 7 U. S. C. §§
291 ff. (1946). Consult Hanna, Antitrust Immunities of Cooperative Asso-
ciations, 13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 488 (1948); Broden, Cooperatives-A
Priileged Restraint of Trade, 23 Notre Dame Law. 110 (1947) ; Euwer,
Federal Control of Leaf Tobacco Marketing, 9 Md. L. Rev. 133 (1948).
125. See Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U. S. 553, 594
(1936).
126. McReynolds, J., dissenting in Maple Flooring Manufacturers'
Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 563, 587 (1925).
127. New York Stock Exchange, Constitution, Art. 12, §§ 1, 3 (mem-
bership to consist of 1375 persons; initiation fee of $4,000 each). Cf. Act of
4 March 1927, 44 Stat. 1424, 15 U. S. C. § 432 (1946) (Boards of trade
not to exclude cooperative sales agencies from membership).
128. New York Stock Exchange, Rules c. 1, § 4 (members not to
deal on the Floor with non-members) ; c. 13, § 3 (members not to maintain
wire communication with offices of non-members without approval of
Exchange) ; Constitution, Art. 17, § 6 (members not to have connections with
rival exchange).
129. Kansas City Board of Trade, Rule 37: "... The board of directors
shall have power . . . to establish a time and place of trading among
members of this Association .. "
130. New York Stock Exchange, Constitution, Article 19, § 1: "Com-
missions shall be charged . .. upon the execution of all orders . . . and
these commissions shall be at rates not less than the rates in this Article
prescribed...." Cf. N. Y. S. E., Rules, c. 7, § 6.
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general headquarters -for its conduct, and thus to ensure a quick
and certain market for the sale or purchase of the article dealt in.
Another purpose has been to provide a standard of business in-
tegrity among the members by adopting rules for just and fair
dealing among them and enforcing the same by penalties for their
violation. The agreements have been voluntary, and the penalties
have been enforced under the supervision and by members of the
association....
"The agreement lacks... every ingredient of a monopoly."
131
An exchange furnishes a rigid structure within wlhich trade in a
commodity may move within defined limits. As so confined, com-
petition in the commodity is "purified."' 32 Incidentally, there is
some sacrifice of competition among brokers in their services.
That small cost, however, is reckoned well worth the benefits
obtained.133
An intermediate position is occupied by dealers in real estate.
Their trading is not confined to a given time and place. But deal-
131. Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604, 616-619 (1898).
Dealers at the Kansas City Stockyards formed the Traders' Live Stock
Exchange. Membership was open to all. A principal rule of the Exchange
forbade- dealing with non-members. Facilities for trading were furnished
by a stock yards company and apparently non-members were accorded
their use on equal terms. Rules of the Exchange compelled members to
pay their debts and otherwise to deal honestly. On bill to enjoin operation
of the exchange, held, bill should be dismissed. The effect of the expulsion
of a member of the Exchange upon trade was considered so slight as
not to fall within the Sherman Act (see opinion at 618). Accord, Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U. S. 231 (1918) ; State v. Duluth
Board of Trade, 107 Minn. 506, 121 N. W. 395 (1909) ; O'Brien v. South
Omaha-Exchange, 101 Neb. 729, 164 N. W. 724 (1917) scnble; Goddard
v. Merchants' Exchange, 9 Mo. App. 290 (1880), aff'd, 78 Mo. 609 (1883)
semble; Cuppel v. Milwaukee, 47 Wis. 670, 3 N. W. 760 (1879) semble; see
Rice v. Board of Trade, 80 Ill. 134, 137 (1875). But see State v. Wilson, 73
Kan. 334, 346, 84 Pac. 737, 738 (1906) (". . . obviously creates a restriction
in the full and free pursuit of ... business... :,). Cf. United States v. New
England Fish Exchange, 258 Fed. 732 (D. Mass. 1919). In United States
v. Swift & Co., 46 F. Supp. 848 (D. Colo. 1942) an indictment alleged that
the major meat packers had agreed not to send agents out to farms to buy
sheep but to confine purchases to the Denver Union Stockyards. Demurrer
sustained. The court could find no harm in channeling transactions into
a public market place.
132. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition 6 (3d ed.
1938); Mund, Open Markets, passim (1948).
133. See Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604, 619 (1898). Good
discussion is found in Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Trade Commission,
13 F. 2d 673 (8th Cir. 1926). While the facts in the case are complex,
the effect of the decision was to approve exchange rules fixing minimum
commssiofs and controlling the dissemination of quotations. In reaching those
conclusions the court reviewed the history of the Minneapolis Grain
Exchange in illuminating fashion (at 688 ff.). The court also discussed
the practice of fixing brokers' commissions and concluded flexible commis-
sions would injure the market for grain (at 691 ff.). It was further said
that an exchange need not furnish quotations to a rival organization, the
purpose of which was to supplant the existing exchange (at 688).
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ings are channeled among members of a group" 4 and concessions
in commissions are discouraged.13 Recently a court has held it
lawful for real estate brokers to fix their commissions by agree-
ment.
86
A still looser arrangement is found in many trade associations.
They collect statistics of sales, shipments, production inventories,
schedules, employment, wages, orders, stocks, and costs.""1 They
compute the standard ratios (of profit to sales, sales to inventory,
labor costs to sales, current assets to current liabilities) for an
entire industry. 38 Finally, following Mr. Eddy's advice, 3 9 they
may report prices in specific transactions.1 40 Such "open price"
plans take many forms, but their common pattern is some simula-
tion of the organized exchanges upon which where all transactions
are immediately made public.
134. National Association of Real Estate Boards, Code of Ethics,
Chicago Real Estate Board, Yearbook 145 ff. (1948), Art. 8: "Negotiations
concerning property which is listed with one Realtor exclusively should
be carried on with the listing broker, not with the owner."
Agreement between Chicago Real Estate Board and Chicago Flat
Janitors' Union provides, in section 4, that janitors may not collect rents
or manage properties. Chicago Real Estate Board, id. at 361 ff. Cf. Article
7 of the national Code of Ethics: "When a Realtor accepts a listing from
another broker, the agency of the broker who offers the listing should be
respected until it has expired. .. ." Id. at 145.
135. Charter, Chicago Real Estate Board, op cit supra note 134, at
143: "7. No member shall solicit properties managed by another member ...
by offering to reduce commissions to a rate less than the owner is paying
his present agent, and in no case less than the approved Schedule of Com-
missions of the Chicago Real Estate Board ... "
136. United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards,(D.D.C. June 4, 1948), CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 62,265 (1948) (effect
upon competition remote).
137. Judkins, op. cit. supra note 10, at 16. Gott found 236 out of 330
associations engaged in gathering statistics of one kind or another, op. cit.
supra note 26, at 1, 10. Judkins' figure was only 40% (at 9). Consult NICB,
op. cit supra note 14, c. 8. One association collects statistics in four series:
(a) monthly business index (orders, shipments, rate of operations, hours
worked by shifts) ; (b) wages and hours; (c) machinery depreciation rates;
(d) operating ratios of various departments of the business. National Screw
Machine Products Association, The Story of a Trade Association 7 (1945).
138. Duncan, op. cit supra note 43, at 70 ff. The following comment
is worthy of note (at 72) : "There is a direct relationship between uniform
accounting procedure in an industry and the conduct of financial and operat-
ing ratio surveys . . . The results of the survey are more reliable if the
data are based upon a uniform accounting procedure."
139. Eddy, op. cit. supra note 12, at 102, 111.
140. Watkins, Price Stabilization Through Trade Organization and
Statistical Cooperation, 139 Annals 44, 48 ff. (1928); Federal Trade
Commission, Open-Price Trade Associations, Sen. Doc. No. 226, 70th Cong.
2d sess. (1929) ; Roberts, The Present Legal Status of Trade Associations
antd Their Problems, 11 Acad. Pol. Sci. Proc. 557, 565 (1926); NICB,
op. cit. supra note 14, c. 7.
Apparently a number of trade associations operate an "Exchange Service.
Providing facilities for the exchange of excess or no longer needed items.
(NOTE: Not a commodity exchange.)" Gott, op. cit. supra note 26, at 5.
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There has been much litigation and discussion of statistical
activities and "open price" plans.141 So long as individual parties to
specific transactions are not identified, the data is made freely avail-
able to the public and information is confined to completed trans-
actions, the courts have tended to approve. But attempts to use the
plans for price fixing purposes have been condemned.1 4 2
Mr. Eddy's original argument for the open-price system can
scarcely be improved upon. In his view real competition requires
knowledge of competitors' activities. Otherwise the race of com-
petition will be run blindly."4 It has also been urged that collec-
141. Consult Handler, supra note 3, at 18 ff.: Donovan, supra note 101,
at 931, 938 ff. Colonel Donovan concluded (at 939) : "It is now clear that
a trade association may distribute current price information where such
distribution is for the purpose of advising competitors and others of market
conditions and not for the purpose of concertedly fixing or raising prices
or curtailing production."
Cf. United States v. Electrical Solderless Institute, (S.D. N.Y. No.
12-217, 4 Jan., 1941), CCH Trade Reg. Serv. ff 25,585 (1941) : paragraph
3 (c) of consent decree prohibits reporting any but completed trans-
actions; paragraph 3 (i) enjoins defendants from: "adopting . . . any
program which adopts methods involving coercion or duress and is designed
to compel adherence to plans for the collection and dissemination of statis-
tical information; provided, however, that procedures designed and executed
solely to give assurance of the completeness and accuracy of data lawfully
collected ... shall not per se be deemed to involve elements of coercion
and duress.'
In United States v. W. C. Bell Services, Inc., (D. Colo. No. 380, 27 Oct.,
1941), CCH Trade Reg. Serv. 52,701 (1941), paragraph 4 (c) of a consent
decree prohibited compilation of statistical data as to sales, shipments,
inventories, costs or prices of retail lumber dealers unless the statistics were
fairly ascertained from completed transactions and made available to every-
one without revealing any individual firm's actions. Paragraph 4 (d) pro-
hibited the gathering and disseminating of statistics regarding average or
typical costs throughout a market or betveen competing retail lumber
dealers. For discussions of the earlier cases and the Hoover-Daugherty
coirespondence, consult Jones, The Present Legal Status of Open Price
Associations, 139 Annals 34 (1928) ; Jones, supra note 27, at 324.
142. In Tag Manufacturers' Institute, F. T. C. Doc. 4496 (1947),
CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 13,574 (1947), the Commission condemned a price
reporting plan whereby each manufacturer filed all his price lists, invoices
and "other intimate details of its business." Data were published in such
a way that price concessions (from the filed lists) by individual manu-
facturers were apparent as such (identity of price cutters revealed). A cease
and desist order was entered forbidding "Penalizing any seller for failure
... to exchange ... information concerning prices in connection with past,
present and future transactions ... Using any price reporting plan tending
to deprive the public of the benefit of price competition in the industry."
Query whether the courts will sustain the order. Petition for review has
been filed. Id. at 13,606. Compare U. S. v. Libbey Owens Ford, (N.D.
Ohio No. 5239, 30 Oct. 1948), CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 62,323 (1948).
143. Eddy, op. cit. supra note 12, at 80 ff. Mr. Eddy's statement deserves
examination in the original text. Another good exposition is found in
Compton, How Competition. Can Be Improved through Association, 11 Acad.
Pol. Sci. Proc. 584, 585 if. (1926). Another Statement: ".... when the reports
are issued accurately, promptly, and clearly, they will become invaluable.
... Fair Competition will be created, customers will be better protected both
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tion and dissemination of statistics will stabilize business. 14' On
the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that the motive for
the establishment of statistical and price reporting systems may
be to raise or maintain prices.1 45 The most thorough study of the
subject arrived at no universal conclusions.21 3 Suggestions that
such activities be carried on by governmental agencies 14 are
answered with some persuasiveness to the effect that trade associa-
tions can do better work.148 To the extent that price reporting
schemes lure industry into the free markets of organized ex-
changes, with their unities of time, place and commodity so dear
to the advocate of "pure" competition, 14 9 it is difficult to under-
stand how they can be considered unlawful. But like other de-
vices, they can be used for undesirable purposes. 150
Agreements Relating to Patents
Patent licenses almost invariably involve cooperation among
competitors.' 5' Most spectacular are the patent pools in such in-
dustries as aircraft'52 and automobile manufacture.15 3 Pools, of
course, are but general licenses made available to all members.
as to service and price, and everyone will benefit by greater prosperity based
on a complete understanding."
Naylor, op. cit. supra note 28, at 277. What does Naylor's assertion
mean? Exchange of statistics may also be helpful in that management may
thus compare the efficiency of various departments of a business.
144. Jones, Business Statistics as a Means of Stabilizing Business, 11
Acad. Pol. Sci. Proc. 598 (1926).
145. For example: ". . . the company executive . . . finds figures
such as we get out of extreme value to him in gauging his plant as against
the industry as a whole... by these comparisons and the opportunity for them
we, in a perfectly legal way, stop a great deal of price cutting."
Cheny, Collection of Industry Statistics, 20 Proc. Am. Trade Ass'n Exs.
135, 137 (1938) ; Naylor, op. cit. supra note 28, at 11 ff. The Association
of Cotton Textile Merchants of New York, op cit. supra note 82, at 25;
Burns, op. cit. supra note 25, at 61 ff.
146. Lyon & Abramson, The Economics of Open Price Systems 144(1936).
147. Judkins, op. cit. supra note 10, at 16.
148. Constantine, Trade Associations and Government Statistics, 42
Am. Stat. Ass'n J. 20, 21 (1947). Constantine asserts the superiority of
private work under six headings: 1. The field surveyed by a trade associa-
tion is usually not limited to its membership. 2. The association keeps up
to date on mergers, bankruptcies, etc. 3. Statistical "breakdowns' are
adjusted to the needs of industry. 4. Service is rapid. 5. Sampling procedures
are better. 6. Associations quickly adapt their methods to changes in con-
ditions.
149. Chamberlin, op. cit. supra note 132, at 7.
150. Cf. Handler, supra note 3, at 29.
151. Trade associations, as such, are not often active in the patent field.
Gott, op. cit. supra note 26, at 4.
152. Toulmin, Patent Pools and Cross Licenses, 22 Va. L. Rev. 119,
144 ff. (1935).
153. Welsh, Patents and Competition in the Automobile Industry,
13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 260, 269 ff. (1948). Other pools are described in
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In the leading case three concerns held conflicting claims to
various patents for the "cracdng" of gasoline. An agreement
among the three released claims of prior infringement and per-
mitted each to use the others' patents. By its terms each of the
three could also license outsiders to use any of the pooled patents
at agreed royalty rates. Fees thus received from the licensees
were to be shared by the three parties in specified ratios. No pro-
vision was made for fixing the price or limiting the production of
gasoline produced through use of the patents. In the Supreme
Court the arrangement was held lawful. 154 An opinion delivered
by Mr. justice Brandeis declared:
"The rate of royalties may, of course, be a decisive factor in
the cost of production. If combining patent owners effectively
dominate an industry, the power to fix and maintain royalties is
tantamount to the power to fix prices.... Where domination exists,
a pooling of competing process patents, or an exchange of licenses
for the purpose of curtailing the manufacture and supply of an
unpatented product is beyond the privileges conferred by the
patents and constitutes a violation of the Sherman Act. The law-
ful individual monopolies granted by the patent statutes cannot
be unitedly exercised to restrain competition.. . . But an agree-
ment for cross-licensing and division of royalties violates the Act
only when used to effect a monopoly, or to fix prices, or to impose
otherwise an unreasonable restraint upon interstate commerce." 1"3
It is difficult to improve upon Mr. Justice Brandeis' statement.
Recently the question of whether a licensor may fix the price at
which his manufacturing licensee shall sell products made with
the patent has been active.1 56 In other respects licensing of patents
remains unchallenged.
A patent license constitutes a pro tanto reduction of the patent
monopoly. Standing alone, therefore, it can hardly be considered
a violation of the anti-trust laws. It has all the good effects of
Kirsh, Patent Pools and Cross Licensing Agreenents, 20 J. Pat. Off. Soc.
733, 742 (1938). International pools are mentioned in Toulmin, supra note
152, at 151 ff. We cannot pause here to consider the cartel problems suggested
by international licenses.
154. Standard Oil Company v. United States, 283 U. S. 163 (1931).
The court (at 170 ff.) refused to find that a mere division of royalties was
an attempt to monopolize.
155. Id. at 174 ff. Cf. United States v. Masonite Corporation, 316
U. S. 265 (1942) (limitation of price at which licensees might sell
product). Consult Folk, The Relation of Patents to the Anti-Trhst Laws,
13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 278, 283 ff. (1948) ; NICB, op. cit. supra note 14,
c. 9; Kirsh & Shapiro, op. cit. supra note 79, c. 8; McCormack, Restrictive
Patent Licenses and Restraint of Trade, 31 Col. L. Rev. 743 (1931).
156. Folk, supra note 155, at 278, 293 ff. The latest Supreme Court
decisions are United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U. S. 287 (1948) and
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364 (1948).
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standardization of commodities 57 and none of the bad, since it per-
mits the consumer to obtain the commodity in question through
another channel but does not restrict his choice. 158 Licenses also
tend to reduce the blocking of technical advancement.' " Observers
find much benefit in the patent pools of the automobile' 00 and air-
craft "6 ' industries. Despite cries of monopoly, a federal commis-
sion concluded that the patent pool in aviation was wholesome:
"It has been alleged with great bitterness ... that the Manu-
facturers' Aircraft Association creates a trust or monopoly and that
its effects are wholly evil and restrictive of invention. We are un-
able to discover any substantial foundation for such com-
plaints .... "162
It is true that patent licenses have been used as devices to fix
prices.' 6 ' And a patent pool can practically compel the member-
ship of an outsider who may be threatened with infringement suits
by a mass of consolidated competitors. 0 4 Such considerations have
led some observers to condemn all licenses and pools. 05 Any whole-
sale outlawry of patent licenses would be similar to a ban upon
fireworks: the device, although beneficial if properly employed,
would be considered too readily abused. In the absence of more
data than has yet been presented such a remedy appears more
drastic than is required.
Simplification and Standardization of Products
Simplification and standardization have come to be used as
words of art. The former is nearly embraced in the phrase, reduc-
tion of variety. Many trade associations have encouraged simplifica-
157. See notes 180 ff. infra.
158. Toulmin, supra note 152, at 119; Kirsh, op. cit. supra note 153, at
743 ft.
159. In Standard Oil Company v. United States, 283 U. S. 163, 171
(1931) it was said: "An interchange of patent rights and a division of
royalties according to the value attributed by the parties to their respective
patent claims is frequently necessary if technical advancement is not to be
blocked by threatened litigation. If the available advantages are open on
reasonable terms to all manufacturers desiring to participate, such inter-
change may promote rather than restrain competition."
160. Jones, supra note 27, at 186 ff.; Welsh, supra note 153, at 270, 272.
161. Federal Aviation Commission, Report, Sen. Doc. No. 15, 74th
Cong. 1st sess. 219 (1935).
162. Id. at 221.
163. In Great Britain the Electric Lamp Manufacturers' Association
is: "... generally assumed to be one of the most powerful monopolies in
British industry ... The restriction of output is effected through an elaborate
patent licensing system .. " Lucas, supra note 17, at 459.
164. Kirsh, supra note 153, at 746 ff.
165. Callman, Patent License Agreements Between Competitors and
the Monopoly Ismse, 28 Geo. L. J. 871, 900 ff. (1940) ; Note, 57 Yale L. J.
1298, 1301 (1948). Cf. complaint in Winkler-Koch Engineering Co. v. Uni-
versal Oil Products Co., 79 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D. N.Y. 1947).
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tion agreements among competitors.16 "Standardization" indicates
an agreement as to the composition, quality and uniformity of a
commodity. It is an even more popular activity.167 Setting of
standards of quality leads to the application of grade marks af-
fixed to the product so made uniform. Competitors may thus
combine to certify quality by the application of appropriate sym-
bols.168 It follows that the goods are more fully labeled than would
otherwise be the case.
166. Gott, op. cit. supra note 26, at 10; Department of Commerce,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 75. Thus the trade rules of the Associated Metal
Lath Manufacturers provided: "5. Every manufacturer agrees to abide
by the Simplification of Excess Varieties as promulgated in the Department
of Commerce...." Lee, op. cit. supra note 14, at 222.
167. Gott found 179 out of 330 associations so engaged. Op. cit. .supra
note 26, at 1, 9; Department of Commerce, op. cit. supra note 7, at 84 ff.;
Foth, op. cit. supra note 15, at 162 ff.; TNEC, op. cit. supra note 21, at 312 ff.;
National Association of Manufacturers, National Trade Associations: A
Study 13 (1922); Edwards, Product Standards and Labeling for Con-
sumers 75 ff. (1940).
An association's Technical Service is described as performing "work
... directed toward development of standards, specifications and design
requirements mutually acceptable to the manufacturing industry and the
government agencies concerned with aeronautical procurement or safety regu-
lation." Aircraft Industries Association of America, Inc., leaflet at 9 (1946).
Tradei-rules of the Associated Metal Lath Manufacturers provided: "1. All
lath made from sheets galvanized before cutting shall conform to the
American Standard of Galvanizing .. . 2. All bundles of lath shall be
identified with 'a tag giving the weight of the lath per square yard and the
kind of metal ... 4. Every manufacturer shall assume full responsibility for
any deviation from the tag... .. Lee, op. cit. sipra note 14, at 222. In 1930
several trade associations joined in the promulgation of Standard Specifica-
tions and Tests for Cotton Goods for Rubber and Pyroxylin Coating.
Association of Cotton Textile Merchants of New York, op. cit. supra note
82, at 39. A trade association in the mercerized cotton yam industry worked
out standards of moisture content (affecting weight) which helped adjust
disputes between dealers. Donovan, How Trade Associations Aid Standardi-
zation Activities, Dun's Rev. 13, 14 ff. (1939). The Society of Automotive
Engineers publishes the S..E. Handbook, standardizing design of parts for
all automobiles. Fortune, Aug., 1948, pp. 79, 81. Cf. T. P. C. Household
Fabric Dye Industry, 12 F. R. 3478, 16 C. F. R. § 171.6(b), CCH Trade
Reg. Rep. 1 20,254 (1947).
British trade associations have been active in simplification and standard-
ization. Their efforts are often supported by the grant of a special trade
mark for uniform goods by the Board of Trade. Langley, Trade Associations
in the United Kingdom, 71 Com. Intelligence J. 61, 62 (1944).
168. "Certification.. Guaranteeing or affirming that products or services
are of .a certain recognized standard, identifying the products of the firm
producing or distributing products as conforming to standard" by "emblems,
quality seals, seals of approval, etc." Gott, op. cit. .stpra note 26, at 9; TNEC,
op. cit. supra, note 21, at 344; Naylor, op. cit. supra note 28, at 125 ff.; Foth,
op. cit. supra note 15, at 174.
An interesting account of the adoption of standards to avoid disputes
and expensive litigation among dealers is found in Moloney, The Story
of the National Cottonseed Products Association 1879-1946, 2 ff. (1946).
Definitions of terms used to designate fabrics are contained in National
Association of Wool Manufacturers, Regulations for the Labelling of Woven
or, Knitted Piece Goods, 65 Bulletin (of N.A.W. Mfgrs.) 292 (1936).
Inspectors are sent out by some lumber associations to check standards of
quality and affix grade marks. Foth, op. cit. supra note 15, at 170.
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Standardization may be applied to products in different ways.
The term may relate to uniformity of nomenclature."' It may indi-
cate an agreement as to quality, performance or dimensions. Some-
times the term affects quantities.1
70
Many branches of the federal government assist standardiza-
tion activities ;1171 many others are engaged in setting standards for
their own use.172 NRA codes frequently provided for standards,
labels and grade marks. The War Production Board urged sim-
plification and standardization upon industry. 7 8 Finally, statutes
have specifically provided for standardization."'
Recently the authorities were collected,7 9 and the conclusion
reached that while standardization may be part of a price fixing
scheme and hence illegal, standardization as such is not within
the purview of the statute.170 Indeed, the Supreme Court has re-
marked:
169. Jones, supra note 27, at 81. Cf. the activities in standardization of
contracts, note 83 supra.
170. Ibid. Trade associations have conducted campaigns in favor of
uniform weights and measures. Naylor, op. cit. supra note 28, at 150.
171. It is said that 33 bureaus of the federal government cooperate in
standardization activities. Department of Commerce, op. cit." spra note 7,
at 87. Specifications are submitted to the National Bureau of Standards,
which, upon approval, promulgates them as "Commercial Standards." Dono-
van, supra note 167, at 14; 11 F. R. 177A-329, 15 C. F. R. § 253.2(a)
(11) (1946).
172. TNEC, Cons mer Standards, passim (monograph No. 24, 76th
Cong. 3d sess. 1941).
173. Id. at 11. Kirsh & Shapiro, op. cit. supra note 79, at 137; Coonley,
supra note 15, at 4.
174. E.g., Grain Standards Act, 39 Stat. 482 (1916), 7 U. S. C. § 71
(1946); paragraph 2 of the act of 3 August, 1912, 37 Stat. 250 (1912),
21 U. S. C. § 20 (1946) (apples); Wool Products Labeling Act, 54 Stat.
1128 (1939), 15 U. S. C. § 68 (1946). But cf. Act of 16 July, 1943, c. 241,§ 5(a), 57 Stat. 566 (1943), 50 U. S. C. § 902(j) (1946) (nothing in this
act shall be construed to permit OPA to require grade labeling or standardize
any commodity).
175. Timberlake, Standardization and Simplification Under the Anti-
Trust Laws, 29 Corn. L. Q. 301 (1944).
176. Id. at 312 ff., 307, 309 ff. Standardization was questioned in
the Hoover-Daugherty correspondence. Jones, supra note 27, at 329. In
Berenson v. H. G. Vogel Co., 253 Mass. 185, 148 N. E. 450 (1925), cert
denied 269 U. S. 577 (1925) competitors used a common bureau to estimate
materials required by specifications submitted for bids. It was held that the
activity was not unlawful, the court saying that standardization of trade
and engineering practices was not in violation of the anti-trust laws. In a
similar case a court declared: "We are unable to find any objection to this
feature [standardization of materials computation] . . . We are impressed
with the thought that uniformity in the terms and phraseology of bids is a
distinct benefit to the builder instead of being an injury." State v. Carondelet
Mill. 309 Mo. 353, 374, 274 S. W. 780, 786 (1925). Cf. NICB, Industrial
Standardization 94 (1929). As to the effects of the Sugar Institute case
in this field, consult Fly, supra note 88, at 250, 45 Yale L. J. 1339, 1349
(1935). It has been suggested that the Paramount Pictures case cast doubt
upon all standardization. Note, 40 Yale L. J. 640, 645 n. 30 (1931). But
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"The defendants have engaged in many activities to which no
exception is taken by the government and which are admittedly
beneficial to the industry and to consumers; such as ... standardi-
zation and improvement of the product."' 77
Not all activities lumped under the heading of simplification and
standardization, however, have been approved by the courts. Ex-
clusion of some competitors from grade-marking systems, has, for
instance, drawn fire.'78 Simplification itself has been prohibited." 0
No doubt such decrees have been motivated by conduct which at
least verged upon price-fixing.
From an engineering point of view, simplification and stand-
ardization unquestionably promote efficiency.'" Observers have
pointed to specific instances in the men's ready-made clothing in-
dustry,:"" the construction of automobiles 8 2 and the erection of
the accepted view is that standardization is only unlawful if used to cloak
price fixing. Kirsh & Shapiro, supra note 79, at 144.
177. Maple Flooring Association v. United States, 268 U. S. 563,
566 (1925). Cf. Fly, sipra note 88, at 250.
178. United States v. National Lumber Manufacturers Ass'n, (D.D.C.
No. 11, 262, 6 May 1941), CCH Trade Reg. Serv. ff 52,593 (1941), consent
decree, paragraph 3 (k) prohibits defendants from "seeking to induce manu-
facturers of lumber ... as a means of certifying conformance to standards
. . . such as are contained in American Lumber Standards [Simplified
Practice Recommendation R 16, Dept. of Commerce, 1924] . . . to apply
. . . a common mark or brand owned or controlled or used by the defendants
or by an association of manufacturers or distributors . . . unless . . . the
use of such mark ... is available . . . to all manufacturers ..... " Accord,
United States v. West Coast Lumbermen's Ass'n, (S.D. Cal. No. 1489-y,
16 April 1941), CCH Trade Reg. Serv. 52,588 (1941), 3(1) of consent
decree; United States v. Western Pine Ass'n, (S.D. Cal. No. 1389-RJ,
6 Feb. 1941), CCH Trade Reg. Serv. ff 52,548 (1941). By paragraph 5 of
the consent decree in that case the association was required to make avail-
able the services of its inspectors for the "grade-marking, the certification
and the re-inspection of lumber produced . . . by non-members ... ." Non-
members were also to be permitted to use the association trade mark if
they complied with its standards. Cf. United States v. National Retail Lumber
Dealers' Ass'n, 40 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. No. 406, 3 Jan. 1941), CCH Trade
Reg. Serv. 52,733 (1942), consent decree ff 3(h) ; United States v. Syn-
thetic Nitrogen Products Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1940) CCH Trade Reg. Serv.
52,700 (1940).
179. United States v. Institute of Carpet Manufacturers, (S.D. N.Y.
No. 12-416, 1941), CCH Trade Reg. Serv. 52,517 (1941).
180. American Engineering Council, Waste in Industry 30, 26, 32
(1921); Edwards, op. cit. suprc note 167, at 57 ff.; Condit, The Economic
Aspects of Stcadardizatio, 137 Annals 39 (1928). A modern instance of the
desirability of standardization has arisen in connection with the introduction
of long-playing phonograph records. Manufacturers have offered records to
be played at differing turntable speeds, so that records and machines are
not interchangeable. Consumers are reported confused. N. Y. Times, Sunday
.23 January 1949, p. 4X col. 1.
181. American Engineering Council, op. cit. sufpra note 180, at 106 ff.
182. Fortune, Aug., 1948, pp. 79, 83, 140 (standardization cut produc-
tion costs 15%); Flugge, Possibilities and Problems of Integration bt the
Automobile Industry, 37 J. Pol. Econ. 150, 158 (1929) (construction of
automobiles largely an assembly job-made possible by standardization).
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dwellings. s3 By making commodities more homogenous standardi-
zation promotes price competition. 8 4 It tends to break down
monopolistic powers of large producers. 85 There is, of course, a
curb on consumers' free choice. But some of the variety to be
eliminated is self-generated by manufacturers without specific con-
sumer demand' and standardization might cause an abundance
more than compensating the consumer for the restriction of his
choice.'8 7 It is the prerequisite to the grade labeling so long urged
as beneficial to the ultimate consumer.,' s Certainly standardization
of nomenclature, so that all parties to a transaction talk the same
language, is inoffensive.8 9
On the other hand, if standardization permits freer price com-
petition, it may also facilitate price fixing.8 0 It may foster the
practice known as "price leadership."'19 As suggested above, sim-
plification does deprive the consumer of variety, and the complaint
on this score may be important if low priced goods are eliminated.1 2
183. Cooper, The "$5,000 House"-a Challenge, N. Y. Times Maga-
zine 15, 52 ff. (May 9, 1948). Standardization may also simplify distribu-
tion. NICB, op. cit. supra note 14, at 185.
184. Robinson, op. cit. supra note 33, at 4 ff. Cf. Jones, upra note 27,
at 90 (standardization leads to market stability because easier to compare
prices of competitors).
185. Thus punch cards manufactured by A may be used in a sorting
machine sold by B. Cf. International Business Machines Corp. v. United
States, 298 U. S. 131 (1936).
186. NICB, op. cit. supra note 14, at 183.
187. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 51 (1944).
188. Edwards, op. cit. supra note 167, at 20 ff.; Chase & Schlink, Your
Money's Worth 226, 265 (1927) ; TNEC, op. cit. supra note 172, at 355 ff.
189. NICB, op. cit. supra note 14, at 187.
190. A friend of associations stated: "By standardizing the product,
establishing uniform terms of sale and uniform discounts, and uniform
accounting, an industry is in a favorable position to make comparisons of
costs and to regulate prices." Foth, op. eit. supra note 15, at 274; NICB,
op. cit. supra note 14, at 185; TNEC, op. cit. supra note 21, at 84; Berge,
Speech before Washington Trade Association Executives (May 16, 1945),
CCH Trade Reg. Serv. ff 54,055 (1945); Comer, Monopoly and Competi-
tion, 36 Am. Econ. Rev. 152, 159 (1946) (lumber industry) ; Foth, op. cit.
supra note 15, at 163 (standardized product leads to standardized methods of
computing charges-citing case of warehousemen's association). A suspi-
cious case: "Manufacturers of steel pipe nipples were confronted with the
practice of making . . . pipe nipples from second-hand or junk pipe, im-
properly threaded and of insufficient strength. In order to assist in prevent-
ing the use of such low-quality nipples, in cases where they were not desired,
the manufacturers of this commodity adopted a commercial standard which
in general required that nipples must be made only from tested new pipe.
." Donovan, supra note 167, at 14. For reference to F. T. C. proceedings
consult CCH Trade Reg. Serv. ff 6380.80 (1948).
191. Burns, op. cit. supra note 25, at 69. Cf. United States v. Inter-
national Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693, 708 ff. (1927).
192. Jones, supra note 27, at 101; Kirsh & Shapiro, op. cit. supra note
79, at 149. But what if the elimination of low priced products be for the
purpose of eradicating shoddy merchandise bringing a trade* into disrepute?
Donovan, supra note 167, at 15 (case of wall paper manufacturers).
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Again, -when prices are standardized, uniformity of product may
destroy the remaining -competition in quality.9 3 Perhaps it is
significant that socialist standardization has brought about a decline
in the quality of goods in Britain.1'9 If consumers are led to be-
lieve that goods are uniform the individual producer may lose his
incentive to maintain standards of workmanship, let alone improve
his wares..
Joint Adzertising and Other Public Relations
Joint advertising is a term loosely' covering several types of
vaguely defined cooperation among competitors. Apart from ad-
vertising proper, heie are "trade promotion," "market develop-
merit" and "public relations." Possibly the latter term is the
more inclusive and should thus be used to describe all the above
activities._,'-
"Trade promotion," its proponents assert, is not mere adver-
tising. 95 It includes market research, advertising and publicity,
"field service"1 and "education."1197 It is a major activity of trade
associations.'91 "Merchandising"' 9 and "market development200
are somewhat synonymous terms not unrelated to "trade promo-
tion." "Public relations," however, as indicated above, suggests
the'field as a whole.201-
Cooperative advertising itself is an old202 and widespread
phenomena. -3 While many instances of such activity can be cited,
there is room for doubt as. to whether it looms large in relation to
advertising by indiidual firms.'0' For public relations as a whole
193. NICB, *op. cit.-supra note 14, at 187 ff.; Kirsh & Shapiro, op. cit.
supra note 79,'at 149. As suggested above (note 178) allowance of "certifi-
cations" only to'members might constitute an attempt to boycott. Duncan, op.
cit.s upra note 43, at 129.
194. Jewkes, op. cit. supra note 61, at 222.
195. Gott, op. cit. supra note 26, at 11.
196. Gott, Trade Pronotion by Trade Associations, 1 Pub. Op. Q. 126,
127 (1937). Cf. note 66 supra.
197. Ibid. The author also lists technical and scientific research under
the heading, an indication of how loosely categories are defined in this field.
198. Gott, op. cit. supra note 26, at 1, 11; TNEC, op. cit. supra note
21, at 319 ff.
199. Foth, op. cit. supra note 15, at 218 ff.
200. Gott, supra note 196, at 127.
201. Gott, op. cit. supra note 26, at 1, 8. Included under the heading
were public accident prevention, supplying information, "education," pub-
licity, sanitation.
202. Agnew, Cooperative Advertising by Competitors 16 ff. (1926).
203. * Gott, op. cit. supra note 26, at 11; Thorpe, Organized Business
Leadership 3 ff. (1931) ; Department of Commerce, op. cit. supra note 7, at
102 ff.
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all media are used. Displays in newspapers and magazines, 205 mo-
tion pictures, 200 expositions 0 7 and contests 208 are employed. Per-
sonal calls have been used to influence the public.2 0 9 Perhaps most
successful, however, is the "promotion," which involves a com-
bination of media.
2 1 0
Several reasons are given for the use of joint advertising.
Some producers may be too small to advertise individually; new
industries may wish to present their commodity to the public
and old ones to combat popular prejudices. 211 Elimination of slack
seasons has been an objective.212
Because programs of the foregoing types are vaguely defined
it is possible to assert that they are educational in nature. Such
claims may stretch the normal meaning of the term, "education":
"The word [education] is applied with utmost equanimity to
204. An observer has said: "The fact that the total volume of adver-
tising placed by trade associations has been large over a period of years
tends to obscure the fact that most association advertising campaigns have
been small, and relatively short-lived." Lockley, Trade Associations as
Advertisers, 8 J. Mark. 189 (1943). The list of associations which have
advertised over twenty years, however, is long. Id. at 190 ff.
205. Agnew, op. cit. mpra note 202, at 129 ff. American Iron & Steel
Institute publishes a bi-monthly magazine, Steelways, the purpose of which
is "to foster a better understanding of the steel industry ... "
206. Portland Cement Association, What it is-What it Does 9 (1944).
207. NICB, op. cit. supra note 14, at 241 ff. (citing many examples)
Gott, supra note 196, at 129; Boyes, Promotion of Wider Markets and New
Uses for Industry Products, 20 Proc. Am. Trade Ass'n Exs. 129, 132 if.
(1938).
208. Id. at 133 ff. (gas industry ran contest among architects for de-
signs using gas appliances, etc.). Cf. Noble, Presentation of Prizes in the
Arerican Trade Association Executives Award Contest, 21 Proc. Am.
Trade Ass'n Exs. 1, 3 ff. (1940) (Douglas Fir Plywood Association ran
advertising campaign directed at architects).
209. Fleckner, Public Relations Activities for Local, State and Regional
Trade Associatiom Executives, Proc. Am. Trade Ass'n Exs. part 8 (1946).
210. An "eighteen day diet" of grapefruit is a good example of a
clever "promotion." But the word has a broad application. It includes such
stunts as "Better Homes Week," "Raisin Week," etc., etc. Gott, supra note
196, at 129 ff. The essence of the "promotion" is that it involves use of
several media. Thus a program designed to combat the decreasing use of
wool involved publicity (causing an increased mention of the word "wool"
in fashion magazines, etc.), fashion design (encouraging the use of woolen
fabrics in creation of new fashions), education (exhibits for schools, etc.)
and merchandising (motion picture film showing retailers how best to sell
woolen goods, etc.). Besse, Report to Wool Manufacturers: Wool Promo-
tion, 65 Bull. Nat. Ass'n of Wool Mfgrs. 255, 256 ff. (1936). Use of a
trade mark for standardized goods may constitute part of a promotion. U. S.
Tariff Commission, op. cit. supra note 38, at 18.
211. NICB, op. cit. supra note 14, at 237 ff.; Agnew, op. cit. supra
note 202, at 90. An interesting case is that of the coffee grinders, whose
cooperative advertising was designed to overcome the prejudice against coffee
created by the crusade of C. S. Post, vendor of the substitute, "Postum."
Id. at 34.
212. Id. at 106 ff.
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the most blatant lobbying and the most insidious publicity. There
is no differentiation between education and propaganda in the
minds of many association executives....,.-s
On the other hand, some cooperative activities of competitors bear
a close resemblance to secondary and collegiate instruction. Thus
the American Meat Institute conducts an Institute of Meat Pack-
ing at the-University of Chicago, offering courses both by cor-
respondence and to students in residence in the production and
marketing of livestock, meat plant management, use of meat by-
products and the like.2 1 4 Many similar examples could be given. '13
And even the dissemination of biased information may be con-
sidered of some educational value.
Every authority indicates that cooperative advertising activi-
ties are lawful. Attorney General Daugherty wrote to Secretary
of Commerce Hoover:
"I can see no objection to cooperative advertising designed to
extend the markets of the-particular article produced ...by the
members of an association .... ,,216
The Supreme Court has referred to such practices as "admittedly
beneficial to industry and consumers."21 7 Any curb on coopera-
tive promulgation of propaganda would, of course, verge upon
constitutional prohibitions. " 8
. It seems likely that joint advertising encourages standardiza-
tion of product.21 9 But as set forth above, standardization alone is
not objectionable. There are some hints that cooperative publicity
has aimed at control of prices. One observer suggested that it
"... tends to promote the beneficial ends of the trade associa-
213. Rowden, op. cit. supra note 41, at 3.
214. Duncan, op. cit. spra note 43, at 109 ff.
215. Another case: "The Irradiated Evaporated Milk Association alone
has over one hundred and fifty publications, many of them written especial-
ly for physicians, dentists, nutritionists, nurses, teachers and social workers
who demonstrate the use of low-cost nutritious food to home workers with
small food budgets.' Rowden, op. cit. supra note 41, at 38. Mrs. Rowden
describes several educational efforts in detail (at 73 ff.).
216. Reprinted in Jones, supra note 27, at 332, 330, 334.
217. Maple Flooring Association v. United States, 268 U. S. 563, 566(1925). In United States v. National Peanut Cleaners' Ass'n, (E.D. Va.
No. 109, 15 June 1925), paragraph 4 (4) of the decree permitted the associa-
tion to "advance or promote the use of peanuts by research, publicity, ad-
vertisement and similar activities.' See also Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
United States, 288 U. S. 344, 366 ff. (1933).
218. Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940) (statute prohibiting
picketing invalid as interference with freedom of speech).
219. Agnew, op. cit. spra note 202, at 10. An observer has declared
that few of the trade associations which advertise "represent industries which
deal in branded products.' Lockley, stupra note 204, at 190.
1949]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tion movement as a whole-to rationalize the free functioning of
competitive forces through constructive cooperation."22
Such a statement can be read to indicate a viewpoint favorable to
monopoly conditions. But there is little real evidence of such an
effect resulting from joint advertising.
A distinction might be drawn between cooperative advertising
promoting one commodity at the expense of another (such as
promoting concrete as opposed to asphalt road building materials)
and publicity which merely seeks to promote a commodity's share
of the national income (campaign in favor of sending flowers on
anniversaries, etc.). In the last analysis, however, such distinctions
probably are but matters of degree: one who sends flowers may
not send candy. In addition, it is hard to say why cement makers
should not enjoy the privilege of pointing out the advantages of
concrete roads.
To believers in Emerson's adage of the better mousetrap, the
whole concept of "public relations," as presently practiced, may
be nauseating. The old fashioned notion that merit should adver-
tise itself still has its adherents.21 But we cry in a sea of brochures
and bulletins whose flood rises even from such sources as our insti-
tutions of higher learning. It would therefore appear that we must
defend ourselves against an offensive war of public relations waged
by groups of competitors, 222 deriving such education as we may
from the struggle. 23
Cooperative Lobbying
"Government relations" is the euphemism for the lobbying in
which trade associations so often indulge. 22 4 Almost every con-
ceivable economic and social group has operated a lobby225 so that
it is not surprising that organizations of competitors do so. Call
it merely "watching legislation" 22 or what you will, trade associa-
220. NICB, op. cit. supra note 14, at 244. Cf. Jones, supra note 27, at
166. It is said that, in the greeting card industry, one purpose of cooperative
advertising was to raise both the quality of the product and prices. Agnew,
op. cit. supra note 202, at 111.
221. Apparently the "public relations" work of the National' Electric
Light Association (subsequently re-organized as the Edison Electric Insti-
tute) aroused antagonism after a Federal Trade Commission investigation
brought its program to light. Judkins, op. cit. supra note 10, at 18.
222. Duncan, op. cit. supra note 43, at 117.
223. Rowden, op. cit. supra note 41, at 60 ("educational" programs
are frequently of some value as education).
224. Gott, op. cit. supra note 26, at 1, 6 (267 out of 330 associations so
engaged; 206 represented industry or trade before legislative and ad-
ministrative bodies).
225. Note, 56 Yale L. J. 304, 307 (1947).
226. Naylor, op. cit. supra note 28, at 146.
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•tons have been "no small factor in swelling the tide" of statute
law ..22
7
"Safeguarding the interests of members of the industry" in
tariff matters is an ancient focus, of cooperative lobbying,228 one
observer quaintly rematking
".... our producers cannot be expected to place themselves at
the mercy of destructive competition, and the association has the
responsibility of protecting its members' interests."229  *
Taxes are perhaps the second most frequent subject of lobbying 3°
with protection against government competition following close
behind.2 3 1 Other common subjects include freight rates, 23- insur-
ance rate- 3  and "fair trade" legislation.2 3' It is worth noting
that trade associations have sometimes pushed the adoption of
bills drawn by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, an activity at least partially altruistic in
character.2 35 Another matter worthy of attention is that officers
of the executive branch of the government use groups of com-
petitors as means to secure the adoption of programs which they
sponsor for industry and trade..2
3 6
Lobbying may be defensive or offensive in character. An inter-
esting example of defensive lobbying is afforded by the vending
machine industry. Legislators (and the public generally) did not
distinguish automatic vending machines (for candy, drinking cups
and the like) -from games of chance (slot machines). Restrictive
legislation and discriminatory taxes thus threatened the ruin of
vending machines. A campaign by a group of competing vending
machine operators has done much to free this form of merchandis-
227. Foth, op. cit. supra note 15, at 76. Cf. National Association of
Manufacturers, op. cit. supra note 167, at 13. In Great Britain. "The con-
duct of discussions and negotiations with government departments is con-
sidered to be the most common specific object of trade associations. Some
associations were even founded at the request of government departments.
Government encouragement has been most pronounced in war time.
Langley, supra note 167, at 62.
228. Gott, op. cit. supra note 26, at 10; Department of Commerce, op.
cit. supra note 7, at 269; Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc., United States Tariff
Commission, Sen. Doc. No. 10, monograph No. 14, 77th Cong. 1st Sess. 15
(1941).
229. Naylor, op. cit. supra note 28, at 146.
230. -Gott, op. cit. supra note 26, at 10.
231. Id. at 6. Such lobbying is truly defensive in character.
232. Jones, supra note 27, at 239; Department of Commerce, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 135, 139 ff. Cf. note 27 supra.
233. Kline, supra note 29, at 24. Cf. note 30 supro.
234. Berge, supra note 190.
235. Foth, op. cit. supra note 15, at 83 ff. Apparently the National Auto-
mobile Chamber of Commerce has been active m procuring the adoption of
uniform vehicle laws. May, supra note 26, at 89.
236. Cf. Judkins, Trade Associations of Manufacturers 5 (2 Industrial
Lecture Series No. 9, New York Quartermaster Office, 1948).
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ing from the toils of legislation.2 37 By way of illustrating offensive
action, there may be cited the instance alleged by an assistant at-
torney general in which an association of lumbermen attempted
to procure the passage of legislation which would require use of
products bearing its trade mark, thus keeping non-member com-
petitors out of the market.23 8
It is widely assumed that groups of competitors may lawfully
cooperate in lobbying activities.23 9 Recently, however, two courts
have made disturbing statements on the subject. In the first case,
concerning a group of brewers, the court declared:
"... the indictments charge appellants with conspiring to in-
fluence ... state policy and with combining to police the enforce-
ment of state laws. Certainly if this were all they were accused
of it would not be enough; for in the light of the Twenty-First
Amendment conduct of that sort would not constitute a federal
offense, notwithstanding it might otherwise be indictable as an
unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act. We know of no
reason why brewers, like other people, may not jointly advocate
state legislation .... ,240
It will be noted that the statement first intimates that lobbying
might be within the Sherman Act if not sheltered by the Twenty-
First Amendment. Then it proceeds, in the next sentence, to sug-
gest that any competitors may combine to lobby. Two years later
another court was guilty of an equally confusing assertion:
"... participating.., in legal proceedings before public boards
237. Greene, Why an Association? 7 ff., 10 (1946) ; 1 N. A. M. A.
Co-Operator No. 2, 3 (1948). Part of the history of the cottonseed interests'
battle against taxes on oleomargarine is told in Moloney, op. cit. Supra note
168, at 4 if. Defensive lobbying is common. Thus in the Charter of the Chi-
cago Real Estate Board it is declared: "Authority is hereby granted to
the Board of Directors to create a Property Owners Bureau .. . the pur-
pose of which shall be to create and foster an organization . . . to act
unitedly in securing relief from discriminatory legislation and taxation."
Illinois (21 Feb. 1883) reprinted in Chicago Real Estate Board, op. cit.
mizpra note 134, at 105, 107.
238. Berge, supra note 190. There is nothing to indicate that groups of
competitors use lobbying methods different from other groups. Possibly
using suppliers to put pressure on legislators is a novel technique. Cf. 1
N. A. M. A. Co-Operator No. 2, 3 (1948) (vending machine operators
secured aid of peanut and tobacco growers in blocking discriminatory state
taxation). For orthodox methods consult Duncan, op. cit. .rupra note 43, at
76 ff.
239. Apparently Attorney General Daugherty took no exception to
lobbying. Jones, supra note 27, at 330. In United States v. National Peanut
Cleaners' Ass'n, (E.D. Va. No. 108, 15 June 1925), paragraph 4 (2) of a
decree permitted the association to "maintain a tariff bureau or commit-
tee and a traffic bureau or committee for the purpose of appearing before
and communicating with any federal body . . . to assist or protect the
American industry from disadvantages by foreign importations, and assist-
ing the peanut industry in transportation and tariff matters. . ..
240. Washington Brewers' Institute v. United States, 137 F. 2d 964, 968
(9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 776 (1943).
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and commissions... fostering the enactment of state laws restric-
tive upon competitive methods of transportation.... Separately and
abstractly considered, activities of that character are within the
lawful right of every citizen.... But when they are done in con-
cert to further the designs of a conspiracy and combination de-
nounced by express statute, they lose their detached character and
become tainted with the illegality of their objective...."241
Did this court say that lobbying by a group of competitors is law-
ful if it is lawful? Or did it suggest that only defensive lobbying is
valid?
Not long ago the Congress undertook to regulate lobbying
generally at its doors.24 2 Possibly that action can be taken as a
declaration that lobbying is inevitable, if not beneficial. But consti-
tutional limitations may have prevented more vigorous repres-
sion.2
43
There is, of course, a case for trade association lobbies. They
supply large amounts of information to legislatures and executive
officers..2 44 In the other direction, they keep track of the voting
records of legislators and check unbridled executive power.242
But it must be admitted that legislative activities may become "as
oppressive to the public as direct price fixing."2 40 Damage wrought
the public interest by high tariffs, manipulation of the currency by
the silver interests and the like is too well known to require enu-
meration. Perhaps it is safe to assert that every offensive victory
gained by a lobby involves cost to consumers-every special privi-
lege casts a burden on the backs of the masses. Defensive lobbies
are less obnoxious. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult to draw
a sharp distinction between offensive and defensive conduct. A
Trailer Coach Manufacturers' Association meets with state, county
and local officials in regard to the formulation or amendment of
zoning laws.2 47 Obviously the purpose is to encourage a welcome
241. United States v. Association of American Railroads, 4 F. R. D.
510, 527 (D. Neb. 1945).
242. Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, Tit. 3, Legislative Reorgani-
zation Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 839 (1946), 2 U. S. C. §§ 261 ff. (1946). Note
that the enactment does not reach state and local activities.
243. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the
people ... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Consti-
tution of the United States, First Amendment.
244. 'E.g., U. S. Tariff Commission, op. cit. m9pra note 38, at 13.
245. Note, 56 Yale L. J. 304, 309 (1947).
246. Foth, op. cit. supra note 15, at 82.
247. Chicago Journal of Commerce, Sept. 4, 1948, p. 1, col. 5. During
the late war the OPA granted an increase of 1/2 cent per pack in the price
of cigarettes at retail. For mechanical reasons vending machine operators
could not take advantage of the change. A group of operators then put
pressure on OPA and secured a full 1 cent increase for their own use.
Hodgson, N. A. M. A. on the Map 1, 3 (1947). Offensive or defensive?
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for trailers and eliminate restrictions upon them. But is the action
offensive or defensive? Every deviation from rules of general ap-
plication suggests a special privilege. But modern "welfare" legis-
lation becomes more and more particularized, bearing upon specific
trades and businesses. To the extent that it does so, the line between
the offensive and defensive lobby is blurred.
"PROTECTION" OF CONSUMERS AGAINST THEMSELVES
Competitors sometimes appoint themselves guardians of the
public interest. They seek to safeguard consumers from their own
ignorance, gullibility, stupidity and immorality. No doubt the
motive of the competitors is merely to improve the standing of
their industry in the eyes of the public. But what they do is to
prevent the transaction of business which consumers are willing
and ready to do.
Thus competitive groups may seek to protect their customers
from fraud and deceit. Organized exchanges are set up explicitly
to maintain the integrity of dealers. Among the objects of associa-
tion of the New York Stock Exchange are
". to furnish . . . facilities for the convenient transaction of
their business by its members; to maintain high standards of com-
mercial honor and integrity among its members ... "218
Members failing to meet their obligations are disciplined24" and
those engaging in fraudulent practices may be expelled.210 When
a trade loses public confidence by reason of dishonesty practiced
by its members, the reputable dealers are apt to form a trade as-
sociation to raise standards. Apparently such a move was recently
made in the radio servicing business in New York City.
2 1
From general codes of ethics groups of competitors may move
to an attack upon specific types of conduct. Misrepresentation of
quality, for instance, is frequently condemned by agreement of
competitors. In the watch industry a trade practice conference
carefully defines trade terms, such as "waterproof," and declares
that misrepresentation of products (misuse of the terms) is an
248. New York Stock Exchange, Constitution, Art. 1 (1925).
249. Id., Art. 16, § 1.
250. Id., Art. 17, §§ 1, 3. Art. 16, § 4, provides that a member, sus-
pended because insolvent, must settle with his creditors and apply for re-
instatement within one year, or his membership shall be disposed of. Article
14 of the Code of Ethics of the National Association of Real Estate Boards
provides: "A Realtor should not buy for himself property listed with him,
nor should he acquire any interest therein, without first making his true
position clearly known to the listing owner." Chicago Real Estate Board,
op. cit. supra note 134, at 145 ff. (1948).
251. New York Times, May 30, 1948 § 10 p 9, col. 3 (formation of
Associated Radio Servicemen of New York).
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unfair trade practice..2 52 Recently the rayon industry-perhaps with
Trade Commission prodding---carried the notion of misrepresenta-
tion-'to the extreme of a positive requirement of labeling: it was
declared an unfair trade practice to sell rayon without disclosure
of the-identity of the fabric. 253 "Unethical" advertising, such as
that- employing contests or premiums, has similarly been pro-
hibited by group action.254 Stock exchanges scrutinize closely the
issies to be traded thereon and admit only, the reputable.255 "Real-
tors" discourage the introduction of persons of different race into
a community.2 56
As set forth above, courts have generally looked with favor
upon organized .exchanges. 57 Their rules, designed to uphold the
integrity of trade, have met-with judicial approval.2 5 8 Were it not,
therefore, for. the -decision in the American Medical Associationz
case, it would seem -that the legality of combinations to suppress
fraud and misrepresentation was assumed.
In American Medical Association v. United States"-5 the Su-
preme Court disapproved-a boycott by a group of physicians against
a- cooperatiye organization called Group Health. Physicians em-
ployed by that corporation were systematically excluded from the
252.' T. P. C. Watch & Watch Case Industry, 16 C. F. YL § 170, CCH
Trade-Reg. Rep. ff 20,253 (1947). Accord, T. P. C. Masonry Waterproofing
Industry,, 16 C. F. R. § 169.7, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ff 20,251 (1946) ;
National- 'Asociation of Real Estate Boards, supra note 134, at 145 ff.;
Lee,. op. cit. supra note 14, at 187 ff.
253. T. P. C. Rayon Industry, 16 C. F. R. § 123.1, CCH Trade Reg.
Serv. 20,206 (-1937). For a discussion of the movement to compel positive
disclosure of contents of goods see Miller, op. cit. supra note 20, at 113, 278
ft.; Kittelle & Campbell, Power of the Federal Trade Commission to Require
Infornutive Labeling of Textiles. 20 B. U. L. Rev. 23. 26 (1940). A similar
rule is found in T. P. C. Vertical Turbine Pump Industry, 16 C. F. R.§ 172.5(b), CCH Trade Reg. Rep. ff 20,255 (1947). Cf. Freer, The Wool
Prodicfts Labeling Act of 1939, 20 Temp. L. Q. 42, 42 ff. (1946).
254. E.g.; T. P. C. Wholesale Confectionery Industry, 11 F. L 8141,
16 C.'F. R. § 168.6, CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 20,252 (1946). Naylor, op. cit.
supra note 28, at 110 if. cites many instances.
255. New York Stock Exchange, Constitution, Art. 10, § 1 (Four-
teenth) (a), (b) (1925). Cf. Fortune, April, 1948, pp. 118, 121 (London
Stock Exchange stricter).
256. National Association of Real Estate Boards, Code of Ethics, Art.
34: "A Realtor should never be instrumental in introducing into a neighbor-
hood a character of property or occupancy, members of any race or nationali-
ty, or any individuals whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property
values in that neighborhood.' .Cf Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948).
Trade associations sometimes attempt to protect their members against
fraudulent "charities" and silk and jewelry associations maintain watches
for stolen goods. Naylor, op. cit. supra note 28, at 145, 153.
257. See note 131 supra.
258. E.g., Gladish v. Bridgeford, 113 Mo, App. 726, 89 S. AV. 77
(1905) (agreement not to deal with member expelled for gross dishonesty).
259. American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U. S. 519
(1943).
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staffs of hospitals controlled by members of the Association. As a
result, their patients could not secure hospital care. The boycott
was held unlawful. It will be noted that the effect of the decision
was to prevent a group of physicians from joining together to
discourage what they considered unethical acts, such as the prac-
tice of medicine by a corporation. Perhaps the decision was sound.
It is one thing to permit members who have freely and voluntarily
joined an exchange to discipline themselves. 200 It is quite another
to allow some competitors to lay down rules for all. After all,
legislatures and courts are the duly appointed authorities for mak-
ing and enforcing laws.
Frequently groups of competitors take action designed to
promote public safety and health. They promulgate sanitary meas-
ures to be observed by their members 201 and set standards of safety
for general compliance. In the field of safety perhaps the most
important work is done by Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc. That
organization, sponsored by the National Board of Fire Under-
writers, tests, inspects and approves devices and materials in rela-
tion to insurance risks .2 2 A more common example is found in
the food business. Recently medical journals suggested that newly
developed insecticides might poison human beings consuming the
crops upon which the chemicals had been sprayed. Apparently
alarmed at the prospect of liability and public disapproval, the
National Canners' Association and the Grocery Manufacturers of
America sought the cooperation of the Agricultural Insecticide
and Fungicide Association in eliminating such health hazards. 203
Possibly the canners and grocers threatened the insecticide makers
with a cry for increased governmental regulation of the use of
chemicals upon crops.
One decision held that protection of public health and safety
did not justify continuance of a system of distribution which had
260. Miller v. Hennepin County Medical Society, 124 Minn. 314, 144
N. W. 1091 (1914).
261. Trade practice rules of Biscuit and Cracker Manufacturers' Asso-
ciation: "3. To maintain a high standard of cleanliness and sanitation in
connection with all operations and in all buildings where good products are
manufactured or stored." Lee, op. cit. supra note 14, at 233; Greene, Are
You a "Jack" or a "Bill"? 1 N. A. M. A. Co-Operator No. 1, 6 (1947)
(attempt to persuade operators of vending machines to exercise sanitary
precautions).
262. Judkins, suepra note 8, at 145. Suggestions for the safe operation
of elevators of members are contained in American Hotel Association,
Operations Bulletin 7 (1948).
263. Chicago Journal of Commerce, Aug. 21, 1948, p. 1, col. 3.
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been used for illegal price maintenance.2 0 4 But it is difficult to see
any harm in a cooperative activity limited to protection of public
health and safety. And if competitors are forbidden to take direct
action they may simply use their combined strength to lobby for
the passage of additional legislation with the same effect. Legisla-
tion is the proper form of public regulation. But it might be difficult
to put every health and safety caution into a code. And it may be
desirable that tentative safety suggestions be promulgated in a
more experimental form than statutes normally permit.
Competitors tread upon less solid ground when they under-
take, to curb speculation. Organized exchanges discourage bucket
shops, chiefly by preventing the dissemination of quotations to other
than bona f de dealers. 265 They also provide for the profitless settle-
ment of transactions arising out of "corners." 2 0 But they go
farther: some exchanges place limits upon prices arrived at in
legitimate transactions entered into in full compliance with their
own rules.2 7 And trade associations may exercise physical con-
trols over economic activity deemed undesirable. Thus the Associa-
tion of American Railroads has declared an "embargo" on all
shipments to certain areas during a period of emergency. - 8 Dur-
ing the period following the war individual steel firms held prices
under free market levels. It thus was necessary for firms to ration
or "allocate" steel to their customers.2 69 Legislation sponsored by
Senator Taft made it lawful for groups of competitors jointly to
exercise such rationing authority."7
Courts have approved crusades against bucket shops. They
have refused to compel exchanges to furnish quotations to pro-
264. See Ethyl Gasoline Corporation v. United States, 309 U. S. 436,
459 ff. (1940). "
265. New York Stock Exchange, Constitution, Art. 10, § 1 (3d) (b);
Id.,Rules, c. 12, § 11 (1).
266. Id., Constitution, Art. 3, § 7. Rules of the Commodity Exchange,
Inc, of New York City provide (§ 408): "The Board of Governors may...
close the Exchange for trading or for all business ... suspend trading in
any commodity ... suspend trading for any delivery month or months for
any commodity.. ..
267. Rules of the Minneapolis Grain Exchange (§ 418 [c]) provide:
"When in the opinion of the Board of Directors an emergency exists, the
Board shall have power from time to time to . . . prohibit trading . . . in
any or all Futures Contracts at prices more than a specified limit above
or below the average closing prices of the preceding business day."
268. Chicago Journal of Commerce, Sept. 2, 1948, p. 1, col. 8 (threat
of longshoremen's strike in Pacific coast ports).
269. Fortune, May, 1948, pp. 94, 176.
270. 61 Stat. 945, (1947) 50 U. S. C. §§ 1911 ff. (Supp. 1946).
271. Board of Trade v. Central Stock Exchange, 98 Ill. App. 212, aff'd,
196 Ill. 396, 63 N. E. 740 (1902); see Moore v. New York Cotton Ex-
change, 270 U. S. 593, 604 ff. (1926). The lower court's opinion is also
worthwhile: 296 Fed. 61, 68 ff. (2d Cir. 1923).
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prietors of gambling establishments."' An agreement among mem-
bers of the cement industry designed to prevent speculation by
their customers was also sustained.2 1t Even direct control of prices
by exchanges has been found lawful under exceptional circum-
stances.2
7
3
Direct price fixing is worthy of closer examination. During the
price "holiday" of 1946, when one price control statute had ex-
pired and the president and the congress had failed to agree upon
another, values of grain for future delivery rose rapidly on the
Chicago Board of Trade. Cargill held contracts requiring Board
members to deliver grain at the former (controlled) low prices.
"Long" on grain futures, it was about to reap a rich reward for
its prudence in negotiating those transactions when the Board is-
sued a regulation requiring Cargill to accept settlement of its
contracts at the former "ceiling" figures. Cargill sued the Board
for treble damages. In a weak opinion, which sought to distinguish
price fixing (admittedly unlawful) from the mere "settlement"
of outstanding contracts, the Circuit Court of Appeals denied re-
covery.274 Even if the action of the Board had not amounted to
price fixing (which it undoubtedly did) it would seem difficult
to justify such private enactment and enforcement of price control
measures375
An interesting case in New York was decided the other way.
Pirnie, Simons & Company engaged in the business of selling a
low-priced "portfolio" of stocks of corporations listed on the New
York Stock Exchange. As little as one share each of various
stocks was included in the "package," but the" sale was bona fide
in every respect. Alleging that the sale of such "portfolios" en-
couraged speculation by persons of small means and caused un-
warranted expense to transfer agents, the Exchange adopted a
rule prohibiting its members from dealing with the sellers of
272. Cement Manufacturers' Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 588,
603 ff. (1925).
273. Cargill, Inc. v. Board of Trade, 164 F. 2d 820 (7th Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 333 U. S. 880 (1948).
274. Cargill, Inc. v. Board of Trade, 164 F. 2d 820 (7th Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 333 U. S. 880 (1948). But cf. Sugar Institute v. United
States, 297 U. S. 553, 593 (1936) (holds illegal an agreement among com-
petitors eliminating "long term contracts" for delivery of sugar, allegedly
speculative upon part of their customers). In Fosburgh v. California &
Hawaiian Refining Co., 291 Fed. 29 (9th Cir. 1923) a restraint upon
alienation was held justified by a desire to cooperate in governmental food
conservation measures.
275. The Cargill case is discussed in 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 144 (1948).
This discussion outlines the exceptional circumstances which may be thought
to justify the decision.
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"packages" priced at less than $500 or who included in the port-
folios less than five shares of any one stock or whose commissions
thereon exceeded ten per cent of market quotations. Enforcement
of the rule was enjoined, the court declaring in an extended
opinion that the governors of the Exchange had no authority thus
to "protect" investors against themselves. "
Exchanges should be allowed to halt "corners," for they are
monopolistic in character. Perhaps they should be permitted to
prevent use of their quotations for gambling purposes. Curbing
speculation is another matter. Even socialist planners admit that
the speculator serves useful purposes.277 And whatever legislative
limits on speculation might be desirable, certainly private parties
should not undertake to control short term investments. By the
same token, rationing by groups of competitors can scarcely be
reconciled with a free enterprise system2 18
Finally, self-appointed guardians of the public interest may
attempt to censor literary and theatrical performances. In this
field the greatest activity apparently takes place in relation to the
production and exhibition of motion picture films. An organiza-
tion properly known as the Motion Picture Association of America,
Inc.,279 and popularly as the "Hays office"28- 0 is the vehicle of
cooperative action. Its membership is made up of motion picture
producers and distributors..2 11 Exhibitors, constituting the other
important segment of the industry, have never belonged. 82 Mem-
bers may be expelled for acts prejudicial "to the best interests of the
Association '2-8 3 and they may also withdraw voluntarily on twelve
276. Pirnie, Simons & Co. v. Whitney, 144 Misc. 812, 259 N. Y. Supp.
193 (1932).
277. Thus it has been said: "Hostility to speculation is mistaken and
arises in part from identifying productive or competitive speculators with
aggressive or monopolistic speculators." Lerner, The Economics of Control
94 (1944).
278. Fortune, Feb, 1948, pp. 2, 4.
279. A New York corporation. Until 17 December 1945, the title was
Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America, Inc. Inglis, Freedom
of the Movies 90 (1947). Its alter ego is the Association of Motion Picture
Producers, Inc., with offices in Hollywood (as opposed to New York). The
description of these organizations here is but a hasty summary of Miss
Inglis' authoritative study, sponsored by the Commission on the Freedom
of the Press.
280. After Will Hays, former Postmaster General and first president
of the organization.
281. Distributors, however, are only eligible for membership if en-
gaged in that business in 8 or more states of the U. S. Motion Picture As-
sociation of America, Inc., By-Laws, 1, 3.
282. Inglis, op. cit. mupra note 279, at 91. "Some small producing
companies belong... No small company has ever been refused membership
because of its size." Ibid.
283. By-Laws, 16. Notice and hearing are prescribed. An expelled
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months' notice. 28 4 Its charter states the objects of the Association
in the following terms:
"Second. The object for which the corporation is to be created
is to foster the common interests of those engaged in the motion
picture industry in the United States, by establishing and main-
taining the highest possible moral and artistic standards in motion
picture production, by developing the educational as well as the
entertainment value and the general usefulness of the motion pic-
ture, by diffusing accurate and reliable information with refer-
ence to the industry, by reforming abuses relative to the industry,
by securing freedom from unjust or unlawful exactions, and by
other lawful and proper means.
2
1
8 5
It is easily established that the Association and its activities are
founded upon lengthy experience. From 1909 to 1922 the National
Board of Review operated a voluntary service for the censorship
of films, the purpose being to make censorship by public officers
unnecessary.2 6 So strong was the agitation against allegedly im-
moral films, however, that in 1921 the state of New York enacted
a statute providing for official censorship.287 Threatened with re-
strictive legislation in other states, the leaders of the industry
forsook the Board of Review and founded the present association
in 1922.288 A court has found:
"From its inception in 1922 the defendant [association] en-
deavored to improve the moral quality of motion picture entertain-
ment and advertising and at the same time to increase the demand
for and support of decent motion pictures....
"... These measures were effective and restored the motion
picture industry in the public esteem. The demand for local censor-
ship laws, which had been strong prior to defendant's formation,
abated." 2 9
During the period prior to 1930 the industry's self-regulation pro-
gram was partly incorporated in a trade practice 290 conference.
member loses his membership fee, which is returnable to one voluntarily
withdrawing.
284. Id. at 15.
285. Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America, Inc., Cer-
tificate of Incorporation, at "Second" (New York, § 12 Membership Cor-
poration Law, 10 March 1922).
286. Inglis, op. cit. mupra note 279, at 75 if. In 1922 the Board claimed
that "all the producers in the National Association of the Motion Picture
Industry have agreed to submit their pictures and abide by the Board's
decisions. The Board views approximately 99 per cent of the total number
of films exhibited." Id. at 80.
287. Id. at 86.
288. Id. at 87 ff. A Congressional investigation was pending at the
time. From the start, the "Hays office" was supported by the major pro-
ducers. Id. at 89.
289. Hughes Tool Company v. Motion Picture Ass'n, 66 F. Supp. 1006
(S.D. N.Y. 1946) finding of fact No. 6.
290. T. P. C. Motion Picture Industry, CCH Trade Reg. Serv. 2541,
rules 21, 20, 5 (1928).
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Apparently the depression induced producers to violate the
voluntary agreements which had theretofore characterized indus-
try censorship. Films were produced which aroused the ire of pure-
minded folk, especially churchmen. An organization named the
Legion of Decency was formed to boycott disapproved pictures
and it succeeded in forcing the producers into a program of com-
pulsory censorship.2 91 Every indication points to the reluctance of
the producers to accept controls.292
At present the power of censorship is founded upon provisions
of the Association's by-laws. Those by-laws permit the Associa-
tion's directors to regulate the content of motion pictures and ad-
vertising. 2 93 The directors exercised their powers by creating a
Production Code Administration (popularly known as the "Breen
Office") to which producer members agreed to submit their
work.29 4 Distributor members of the Association agreed not to
handle films which.did not bear the P.C.A. seal of approval.29 5 As a
result of the foregoing arrangements films passed by the P.C.A.
constitute the vast majority of the commercial entertainment mo-
tion pictures exhibited in the United States.29 0 All plays reaching
the New York stage are reviewed by P.C.A. representatives and
"a negative opinion means that the play has little chance of
reaching the screen without such drastic changes as to make the use
of the title virtually a fraud upon the public.12 9
7
291. Hughes Tool Company v. Motion Picture Ass'n, 66 F. Supp. 1006(S.M. N.Y. 1946) finding of fact No. 6; Inglis, op. cit. su pra note 279, at
120 ff.
292. Id. at 96,111 (1947).
293. By-Laws, 14: "The Board of Directors, in pursuance of the As-
sociation's purpose to establish the highest possible moral and artistic
standards of motion picture production, may from time to time make pro-
visions in relation to the observation and maintenance of accepted standards
of morality and good taste in the content of motion pictures and for the
adherence to all applications and interpretations of such standards, and all
;such provisions so made... shall be binding upon the members....
The Board of Directors may from time to time make provisions in
relation to the observation and maintenance of standards of fair representa-
tion and good taste in the advertising of motion pictures and for the ad-
herence to all applications and interpretations of such standards, and all
such provisions so made and for the time being in force shall be binding
upon the members... " Hughes Tool Company v. Motion Picture Ass'n, 66
F. Supp. 1006 (S.D. N.Y. 1946) finding of fact No. 4.
294. Inglis, op. cit. supra note 279, at 139 ff. In practice, scripts are
submitted prior to production of the film proper.
295. See Hughes Tool Co. v. Motion Picture Ass'n, 66 F. Supp. 1006(S.D. N.Y. 1946) finding of fact No. 11.
296. Inglis, op. cit. supra note 279, at 143.
297. Id. at 153. Independent producers have "voluntarily" submitted
to censorship in order to obtain distribution. There is some feeling that
they are more strictly censored than members of the Association. Id. at
187 ff.
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Censorship appears also to be exercised by groups of competitors
in the broadcasting 98 and perhaps the baseball 299 industries.
Only one decision involving the validity of such censorship has
come to light. In 1946 a direct attack was made upon the agree-
ments providing for control of motion picture content. But a dis-
trict court refused to enjoin their enforcement, declaring that if
any restraint were involved, it was a reasonable one. 00 It should
be noted, however, that the conduct of the plaintiff (producer) in
the case had been so lacking in propriety that any judge would
have been prejudiced against him. In addition, the decision could
have been reached purely on the grounds that the plaintiff, a mem-
ber of the Association, was bound by his voluntary agreement
(notwithstanding its alleged illegality). It would seem possible
that an exhibitor, not connected with the major producers or dis-
tributors,8 1' might succeed in pushing the Association out of its
present seat of authority.
In this day and age the very notion of censorship is repugnant
to many minds. And the idea of private parties combining to pre-
vent the filming of interesting books and plays80 2 is hardly appeal-
ing. Such self regulation is not even subject to judicial review. °
The control is not exercised for altruistic purposes: industries
which assume guardianship over public morals do so for their own
good. A somewhat comparable situation has arisen in Great
Britain in that the "planners" make decisions for consumers. They
compel the workingman to buy milk for his child rather than ale
298. It appears that the National Association of Broadcasters instituted
a "system of self-regulation designed to make further government regula-
tion or control unnecessary . . . Its code included industrial regulation
requirements as to the broadcasting of controversial public issues, religious
and current news broadcasts . . . The self-imposed restraint caused some
loss in revenue, but won wide public approval." Noble, .supra note 208, at 5.
Apparently, however, the "code" is lacking in enforcement procedures and is
less important than the controls exercised by the Federal -Communications
Commission, the "networks" and advertisers. Note, 57 Yale L. J. 275, 292 n.
89 (1947).
299. Major league rule 15 (a) : "Any player who violates his contract
or reservation or who knowingly participates in a game with or against a
Club containing or controlled by ineligible players or a player under indict-
ment for conduct detrimental to the good repute of professional baseball,
shall be considered an ineligible player. .. ."
300. See Hughes Tool Company v. Motion Picture Ass'n, 66 F. Supp.
1006, 1013 (S.D. N.Y. 1946).
301. The plight of the independent exhibitor (after years of anti-trust
actions against the major units in the industry) is portrayed in Fortune,
Aug., 1948, p. 95.
302. Inglis, op. cit. sitpra note 279, at 112.
303. Id. at 174.
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for himself. Exception has been taken to such planning.30' But at
least the "planners" are officers of an elected government.
• As a practical matter, however, it appears that our choice is
limited. If private parties do not control the content of motion
pictures, the political demand for official censorship will be too
strong to resist.30 5 Here arises an interesting speculation: how far
should matters of political necessity affect policy judgments?
Apparently the Commission on the Freedom of the Press felt that
political forces could not be overlooked and that the evils of private
control were less onerous than the weight of official suppression.300
Nevertheless a court might be tempted to strike a blow for
freedom.
ACTIVITIES APPARENTLY ONLY OF INTERNAL INTEREST
There remain a number of things which groups of competitors
do without apparent effect upon outsiders. That is, the action in
and of itself, seems not to affect non-members. Thus trade associa-
tions supply their niembers with a steady stream of information,
publishing bulletins, reports, trade directories and the like.307 Finan-
cial practices of the industry are studied308 and members are ad-
vised concerning technical matters.30 9 Among the latter are ques-
tions .of law: many trade associations render services to their
members by disseminating digests of decisions and legislation.
3 1 0
Others go so far as to retain counsel and broadcast his advice.311
304. Jewkes, op. cit. s=pra note 61, at 104 ff.; Robbins, The Economic
Problem in Peace and War 16 (1947). Is the problem wholly different
from the "protection!' afforded honest business by racketeers?
305. Inglis, op. cit. supra note 279, at 173.
306. Id. c. 5 ff. Miss Inglis herself seemed to reach much the same
conclusion. Id. at 180. It is true that centralized self-control in the motion
picture industry is more efficient than cutting by local censors. Id. at 176.
307. Judkins, op. cit. supra note 10, at 13. Registers of customers and
suppliers are among trade association publications. Gott, op. cit. supra note
26, at 1, 6 ff. Cf. note 97 supra. One association has published more than
110 bulletins on such subjects as bankruptcy, child labor, consumer coopera-
tives, consumer standards, food and drugs, housing, industrial regulation,
labor disputes, monetary reform, social security, taxation and %%ages.
American Retail Federation, What is the American Retail Federation? 7
(1938).
308. Gott; op. cit. supra note 26, at 6.
309. Many associations engage in "Expert service. Rendering scientific.
technical engineering, or management consulting services through specialists."
Id. at 5.
310. Foth, op. cit.'supra note 15, at 84; Gutelius, supra note 43, at 37.
311. Gott, op. cit. supra note 26, at 7. Thus, information regarding tax
problems is made available to members. Id. at 10. One association stated:
"The Institute retains a well-known firm of attorneys whose services include
rendering of opinions from time to time on legal questions of common interest
to the membership. The opinions are furnished without charge to member
companies.' The propriety of such action has been questioned. Donovan.
Trade Association Administration and Protection Under the Anti-Trust
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Of course trade journals perform much the same functions.
Trade associations have often urged their members to adopt
uniform accounting procedures and have furnished assistance in
the creation of such systems.312 Although admittedly helpful to
small firms which could not alone afford the study necessary to
adapt general principles to a specific industry,813 the promotion of
uniform accounting has often given rise to suspicions of price-
fixing.31 4 As a result, the practice has not always been favored in
the courts. 15
Competitors join forces to support industrial research proj-
ects .31 Market analysis, or commercial research, has been the
Laws, 30 Geo. L. J. 149, 150 ff. (1941). Canon of Ethics No. 35 of the
Chicago Bar Association provides: "A lawyer may accept employment from
any organization, such as a . . . trade association, to render legal services
in any matter in which the organization, as an entity, is interested, but this
employment should not include the rendering of legal services to the meun-
bers of such an organization in respect to their individual affairs."
312. TNEC, op. cit. supra note 21, at 257 if.; NICB, op. cit. supra
note 14, at 232; Gott, op. cit. supra note 26, at 12; National Association of
Manufacturers, op. cit. supra note 167, at 11; Naylor, op. cit. mpra note 28,
at 162, 182 ff.; Lee, op. cit. supra note 14, at 222.
313. NICB, op. cit. sitpra note 14, at 230.
314. Prior to the NRA, many cost accounting systems were "mere
instrumentalities for controlling the prices in an industry." Kirsh & Shapiro,
op. cit. mrupra note 79, at 80; Note, 57 Yale L. J. 391, 403 ff. (1948). It has
been said that ". . . a better knowledge of costs inevitably leads to stabiliza-
tion of prices." Foth, op. cit. supra note 15, at 272. Instances are given in
which a manufacturer has been "educated" not to cut prices after installing
uniform cost accounting. Halligan, The Relation of Uniform Cost Account-
ing to Competition, 139 Annals 74, 75, 79 (1928). One advocate of cost
accounting said: "Destructive competition is due . . . to a lack of knowledge
of individual manufacturing costs. Correct costs mean fair competitive
prices." Naylor, op. cit. supra note 28, at 187. And ". . . the main objects
of the National Retail Monument Dealers' Association are to improve the
character of cemetery memorials and to establish a standard selling price,
not by legislation, but by a system of education as to correct factory costs."
Id. at 100. Note the use of the word "education." In the code of ethics of the
Advertising Specialty Association it was provided: "We, each, pledge our-
selves to the adoption . . . of a comprehensive . . . cost system to the end
that capricious and senseless variations . . . in price may be eliminated ......
Lee, op. cit. supra note 14, at 191. In Great Britain "a number of [trade]
associations have adopted uniform methods of cost accounting. This arrange-
ment may to some extent serve the purpose of preventing under-cutting."
Langley, supra note 167, at 64.
315. United States v. Western Pine Association, (S.D. Cal. No.
1389-RJ, 6 Feb. 1941) (paragraph 3 [k] of consent decree prohibits pro-
motion of uniform accounting). But cf. United States v. National Container
Association, (S.D. N.Y. No. 8-318, 23 April 1940) (paragraph 3 of con-
sent decree permits promotion of uniform accounting systems). For Attorney
General Daugherty's views see Jones, suipra note 27, at 332.
316. TNEC, op. cit. supra note 21, at 301; Department of Commerce,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 67 ff.; NICB, op. cit. supra note 14, at 221 ff.
Some associations coordinate the individual research of members. Gott,
op. cit. supra note 26, at 8.
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subject of similar programs. 31- Thus the Portland Cement Associa-
tion studies the heat insulating values of concrete; 31S the Society
of Automotive Engineers sponsored a mass attack upon the
problem of engine "knocking" ;319 bitunnous coal producers jointly
designed a new type of furnace (allegedly smokeless) to consume
their fuel ;320 and the Dry Milk Institute discovered a wholly new
product, several million dollars worth of which has been sold..
3 21
While part of the research is in or near the realm of pure science,
it is rarely wholly altruistic. The American Dairy Association,
for example, sponsored studies which demonstrated that "butter
is better" (more food value in butterfat than in vegetable fat).32-
Although some question has been raised as to the legality of
joint research, 23 the Supreme Court has recently pronounced its
blessing:
"The development of patents by cooperating units of an
industry through organized research groups is a well known
phenomenon. However far advanced over the lone inventor's ex-
perimentation this method of seeking improvement in the prac-
tices of the arts and sciences may be, there can be no objection,
on the score of illegality, either to the mere size of such a group or
the thoroughness of its research."32 4
It is difficult to quarrel with that conclusion. In many instances
joint research may be more efficient. -3 2 5 And it may improve com-
petition by destroying trade secrets.3 20 A distinction can be drawn
between research which merely reduces costs within an industry
and developments designed to improve competitive relationships
as against another group of producers. But the effects of the two
are probably similar. Again, joint research doubtless promotes
standardization of product. But there is little legal objection to
that.327
317. Foth, op. cit. supra note 15, at 191 ff., TNEC, op. cit. sipra note
21, at 344. Market research "involves an analysis of distribution channels
and distribution policies, an analysis of customer contacts and consumer
returns, and a study of distribution costs, in some cases by customers and
territories." Gott, supra note 196, at 128.
318. Portland Cement Association, op. cit. mspra note 206, at 7.
319. Fortune, Aug., 1948, pp. 79, 81.
320. Advertisement of Bituminous Coal Institute, Time, Aug. 16, 1948,
p. 103, col. 2.
321. Gott, op. cit. supra note 196, at 127 ff.
322. American Dairy Association, Search in Science 26 (1948).
323. Edwards, An Appraisal of the Anti-Trust Laws, 36 Am. Econ.
Rev. 172, 174 (1946).
324. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U. S. 287, 310 (1948).
See also Edwards, supra note 323, at 175; Jones, stpra note 27, at 126.
325. Kinney, Development of Industry Through Research, 17 Proc. Am.
Trade Ass'n Exs. 53, 84 ff. (1936).
326. Foth, op. cit. supra note 15, at 133 ff.
327. See note 176 supra.
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Trade associations frequently sponsor arbitration of commer-
cial disputes.3 28 Apparently little difficulty is encountered so long as
the disputes concern only association members.3 2 0 An attempt to
bind outsiders to arbitrate differences may lead to embarrassment.""
CONCLUSIONS
This hasty survey of facts and law cannot assume to reach de-
tailed conclusions. Each case, as the "realists" so tiresomely assert,
must stand upon its own merits. But perhaps a general survey
may suggest a frame of reference for individual problems. And
possibly the hazarding of a few principles may serve to counteract
the specious pleading of the "merits" of specific cases and to outline
general considerations of public welfare with which decisions
should be consistent.
3 3 1
In declaring that the solution of problems must depend largely
upon a detailed consideration of facts-and particularly of the
effects of the trade practice under consideration-price, of course,
is the point of focus. An effect upon prices is the touchstone in
determining the legality of activities of groups of competitors. 8
2
No matter for what purpose competitors are organized, some mem-
bers are apt to favor schemes for lifting the burden of free prices.
If the group can successfully resist that pressure, it has done much
to demonstrate its fitness to survive. 83
Much, perhaps, but not all. For if private organizations attempt to
make and enforce laws,3 3 4 then their activities should be scrutinized
328. Foth, op. cit. supra note 15, at 89 ff.; Naylor, op. cit. supra note
28, at 148 ff. In baseball, major league rule 22(b) states: "All disputes
between players and clubs shall be referred to the Commissioner and his
decisions shall be accepted by all parties as final." The players, of course,
are not parties to the agreements among the baseball clubs. Cf. rules of
Hardwood Manufacturers' Institute. Lee, op. cit. supra note 14, at 196 ff.
329. NICB, op. cit. mtpra note 14, at 280 ff.
330. Majestic Theater Company v. United Artists' Corporation, 43 F.
2d 991 (D.D.C. 1930). There are, of course, objections to arbitration as such,
Phillips, The Paradox in Arbitration Law, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1258, 1274 ff.
(1933).
331. Jewkes, op. cit. supra note 61, at 12.
332. Restatement, Contracts § 515(c). In Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
310 U. S. 469, 50 ff. (1940) it was said: "Restraints on competition or on
the course of trade in the merchandising of articles moving in interstate
commerce is not enough, unless the restraint is shown to have or is intended
to have an effect upon prices in the market or otherwise to deprive pur-
chasers or consumers of the advantages which they derive from free com-
petition."
333. It has been suggested that any activity is lawful if it does not
affect prices. Hays & Ratzkin, Trade Association Activities and Anti-Trust
Law, 25 Harv. Bus. Rev. 501, 519 (1947).
334. See pp. 351-53 supra. Cf. United States Asphalt Refining Co. v.
Trinidad Lake Co., 222 Fed. 1006, 1008 ff. (S.D. N.Y. 1915) (attack by
Hough, J., upon courts which refuse to enforce arbitration agreements on the
grounds that they oust the courts of their jurisdiction).
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with care. Government simply cannot abdicate its role of law
giver. Nor can it brook competition with its citizens in that regard.
On the other hand, if agreements affect only the (voluntary) parties
thereto, it is difficult to find fault with them. And some restriction
of outsiders (as in the case of organized exchanges) may be justi-
'fied by attempts to perfect a primary market. One observer likens
such reasonable restraints to levees which cause a stream to run to
the sea in an orderly manner; he contrasts them to dams, which
stop its flow.335
There remains the larger issue of the role of groups of com-
petitors in a democracy. We know that organization breeds power
and power is dangerous. In some instances we may distinguish
offensive from defensive combinations. An, agreement to defend
an industry from outside attack (such as a proposal to burden it
with a special tax) can be supported more easily than an aggres-
sive scheme (such as a drive to raise tariff rates). Many trade as-
sociation activities, however, take both offensive and defensive
parts. Their purpose is to allay public distrust and disfavor by
currying confidence and friendship. Thus restrictive legislation is
avoided before it is proposed. Offensive and defensive programs
merge in the preventive war of "public relations."
It may be dangerous, too, to assume that every "defensive"
group is harmless. To strengthen the position of weak interests is
an invitingly simple method of checking abuses of the strong. And it
has much political appeal. Thus the National Labor Relations Act
was avowedly designed to balance bargaining power of employers
and employees.338 Equalizing measures, however, lead to more of
the same. As one group increases its bargaining power, its op-
ponents seek to do likewise. Organizations snowball and gather
strength. As they grow bigger and stronger the groups pose vast
questions for economic and political democracy.33 - The end, of
course, is totalitarianism. And yet, while our economy remains but
partly free, it is difficult to deny the unorganized the special privi-
leges enjoyed by those.already joined together.
335. Department of Commerce, op. cit. supra note 7, at 48 ff.
336. Section 1 of the National Labor Relations Act declared:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess
full freedom of alsociation . . . and employers who are organized in the
corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens ...
commerce -.. , by preventing the stabilization of competitive wvage rates...."
49 Stat. 449 (1935); 29 U. S. C. § 151 (1946). As to the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, see Columbia River Packers' Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U. S. 143. 145 (1942).
Cf. § 6 of the Clayton Act and the Capper-Volstead Act, note 124 supra.
337. Feller, Public Policy of Indtatrial Control in Public Policy 130,
137 (Friedrich ed. 1940).
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Since the days of Adam Smith 3 3 there has been a school of
thought which regards any cooperation among competitors as a
conspiracy against the people. One observer, for example, tartly
remarked:
"The generic purpose of trade associations is in some way to
allay the rigors of trade competition, in order to assure or increase
profits."
339
The fact that trade associations form focal points for economic
planning,34 ° their prominent role in the NRA experiment 34' and
the favor shown them by socialists3 42 lends support to such a view-
point. Trade associations played a strong role in fascist Italy, en-
joying broad legislative powers .343 Those who dread the spread of
particularist "welfare" legislation and economic planning therefore
deem it desirable to nip all joint activities of competitors in the
bud.344 Their program calls only for security for the individual as
such, not for his vocation,345 and trade associations represent or-
ganized occupations. They seek a government equally inactive,
preferring to limit the role of the state in the economy to the
maintenance of the demand side of the market.3 40
338. The famous remark is: "People of the same trade seldom meet
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a
conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices." I
Smith, The Wealth of Nations 134 (6th ed. 1793). ". . . it has been axiomatic
that a trade association will fix prices if it can-and has done so whenever
it could." 8 Fortune 2 [sic] 39 (1933).
339. Watkins, supra note 25, at 671. Professor Watkins made similar
comments upon industrial "institutes." Watkins, supra note 140, at 48.
Another student commented upon trade associations as follows: "It is not
the general advice and assistance to the members, but the desire for indus-
trial control, which is the driving force behind the whole movement. Legisla-
tive, statistical and technical aid may be helpful to business men, but the
elimination of over-production and price cutting is vital. The real core of
the trade association movement has lain in its attack on free competition.
." Whitney, op. cit. supra note 17, at 38.
340. Javits, Business and the Public Interest 52 ff., 59 ff. (1932)
Whitehorse, The Trade Associatio's Place in Business Planning, 12 Proc.
Am. Trade Ass'n Exs. 56, 59 ff. (1931).
341. Association of Cotton Textile Merchants, op. cit. supra note 82,
at 28 (trade association and NRA personnel the same).
342. Political & Economic Planning, Trade Associations and Govern-
ment 19, in Planning No. 240 (1945).
343. Anselmi, Trade Associations and Corporations in Italy, 31 Int.
Lab. Rev. 6, 7 ff. (1935). Even prior to the advent of the Labor regime,
Britain was badly afflicted with price-fixing trade associations. Prager,
Trade Associations in Great Britain, 3 Agenda, 137, 142 ff. (1944) ; Jewkes,
op. cit. supra note 61, at 37.
344. Cf. Fashion Guild v. F. T. C., 312 U. S. 457, 466 (1941).
345. Brown, The Future Economic Policy of the United States 47 ff.
(1943).
346. Robbins, op. cit. supra note 304, at 83. This is not an anti-enter-
prise point of view: "It should be the business man who clamours . . . for
the control of monopoly. Only in that way can he forestall the socialist who
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We cannot, however, overlook the benefits of private action.34
Practically speaking, many activities will be undertaken anyway,
our only choice being whether they shall be done by groups of
competitors or by government. Private action is more responsive
to actual needs; it lifts a load from the taxpayer and places it in
hands responsive to changing conditions. To encourage govern-
ment to undertake many such functions might be to invite the
creation of a vast bureaucracy which could easily deviate into par-
ticularist controls over the physical movement of men and goods.
As Mr. Hoover declared:
"Any collective activity can be used as a cloak for conspiracy
against the public interest, as can any meeting of men engaged in
business, but it does not follow because bricks have been used foi
murder that we should prohibit bricks."3 48
Perhaps Mr. Hoover's simile of bricks is imperfect. If an object
is sufficiently dangerous, we do prohibit it.34 1 On the other hand,
we should be foolish to expect that government can undertake all
our burdens without placing freedom in peril. In any event, we
must see our problems in their entirety. As the master artist said,
c... virtue can be essentially but the virtue of the whole, the
wayside traps set in the interest of muddlement and pleading but
the cause of the moment, of the particular bit in itself, have to be
kicked out of the path !"Y350
advocates nationalization as the cure for private monopoly. Jewkes, op. cit.
supra note 61, at 57. It should not be confused with the advocacy of strict
controls over monopolistic business practices combined with approval of
governmental restraints of trade. E.g., Landis et al., Report in Stocking &
Watkins, Cartels or Competition? 403, 441 ff. (1948).
347. Oliphant, supra note 8, at 382 ff. semble; Roberts, supra note
140, at 559.
348. Hoover, op. cit. mtpra note 61, at 30.
349. E.g., Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 763, 42 U. S. C. §
1806(b) (1946).
350. James, preface to The Ambassadors in The Art of the Novel 307,
320 (Blackmur ed. 1934).
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